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1-800 Contacts, Inc. (“1-800 Contacts”) petitions this Court to review the 
decision of the Federal Trade Commission (the “Commission”) finding thirteen 
trademark infringement settlement agreements and one vertical sourcing agreement 
to be unlawful restraints of trade under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act and barring the enforcement of certain provisions.   
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
To understand this case, it is necessary to go back almost two decades, when 
the Commission began its regulatory assault on settlements of intellectual property 
(“IP”) claims.  The Commission started with “reverse-payment” patent settlements.  
These “unusual” settlements arose within a “unique” regulatory structure under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act—a structure that (unintentionally) produces “incentives for 
collusion.”  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 147, 156-57 (2013) (citation 
omitted).  In this context, patent holding-plaintiffs paid millions of dollars to 
allegedly infringing defendants (a reverse payment) to stay out of the market to settle 
the infringement claims.  Id. at 144-46.  To the Commission, these were no ordinary 
IP settlements:  they were illegal agreements not to compete.      
Even as to these exclusionary patent settlements, this Court and others refused 
to condemn them under antitrust law, fearing that antitrust second-guessing would 
deter settlements and undermine patent policy, and that courts applying antitrust 
principles had no good way to conduct an after-the-fact analysis of the patent claim.  
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See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 203 (2d Cir. 2006).  
A majority of the Supreme Court recognized these concerns, but narrowly (and 
reluctantly) agreed with the Commission that there “are sound reasons to treat 
reverse-payment settlements differently” than other settlements.  Br. for Pet. at 16, 
FTC v. Watson Pharms. Inc. (Actavis), No. 12-416 (S. Ct. Jan. 22, 2013) (hereinafter 
“FTC Actavis Br.”).  As the majority explained, these settlements go to the core 
concern of antitrust—complete exclusion from the market—and where there is a 
“large and unjustified” reverse payment, antitrust law should play some role to 
prevent what looks like a splitting of monopoly profits.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158.   
At the same time, the majority was careful to cabin its holding.  Indeed, the 
majority mollified the dissenters (and business community) by disclaiming any 
extension of antitrust to ordinary IP settlements:  “Insofar as the dissent urges that 
settlements taking these commonplace forms [i.e., without a reverse payment] have 
not been thought for that reason alone subject to antitrust liability, we agree and do 
not intend to alter that understanding.”  Id. at 152.  But the dissenters considered this 
cold comfort, “fear[ing] the Court’s attempt to limit its holding to the context of 
patent settlements under Hatch-Waxman will not last long.”  Id. at 170.  That leads 
us to this case.  
1-800 Contacts is a shining example of trademark policy at work.  1-800 
Contacts started from literally nothing in a college dorm room.  Through ingenuity, 
3 
 
massive investments in its brand, and superior customer service, it was able to 
disrupt doctors’ stranglehold on the market for retail sale of contact lenses.  Rather 
than investing in their own brands, 1-800 Contacts’ competitors tried to improperly 
divert sales by paying search engines to show their ads when consumers searched 
for 1-800 Contacts’ federally-protected trademarks.   
Thus, as numerous other companies did as part of a common trademark 
protection strategy, 1-800 Contacts prosecuted and settled a series of trademark 
infringement claims aimed at halting this type of infringing conduct:  bidding on 
trademarked terms in auctions for paid search advertisements (ads search engines 
display in response to user searches).  The Commission concedes that (1) these 
trademark claims were legitimate—i.e., not shams; (2) the principal relief in the 
trademark settlements (no bidding on trademarked terms in search advertising 
auctions) appeared in other settlements and was ordered by courts; and (3) the 
settlements did not limit other forms of advertising, only the infringing advertising.  
Nevertheless, in a split decision, a majority of the Commission blew through Actavis 
and its careful distinctions—holding that 1-800 Contacts’ commonplace, non-
exclusionary trademark settlements were not only subject to antitrust second-
guessing, but they were presumptively unlawful.  Although the majority refused to 
admit it, the import of this ruling is that a plaintiff can state a plausible antitrust 
claim, exposing a trademark owner to expensive and potentially ruinous antitrust 
4 
litigation, simply by pointing to any trademark settlement that requires an alleged 
infringer to stop running an infringing advertisement.       
As Commissioner Noah Phillips’ 46-page dissent (hereinafter “Dissent”) 
explains, this “drastic” decision goes well beyond Actavis, will deter legitimate 
settlements, and “foster uncertainty and undermine trademark policy.”  Dissent 1, 
10. Commissioner Phillips is not alone in that assessment.  Former Commissioner
Joshua Wright, academics, and others have likewise bemoaned the decision because 
it “dismisses . . . the intellectual property interest at stake,” reflects “exceedingly 
weak” economic analysis, and “has the potential to chill procompetitive behavior.” 
Manne, Singer & Wright, Antitrust Out of Focus: The FTC’s Myopic Pursuit of 1-
800 Contacts’ Trademark Settlements, 18 THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, no. 5, Apr. 2019,
at 3, 11, 16 (“Wright Article”). 
 To restore a proper balance between IP and antitrust policy, this Court, 
consistent with Actavis, should reject the Commission’s decision and hold the 
trademark settlements here are not subject to antitrust second-guessing.  Unlike 
patents, “trademarks are by their nature non-exclusionary,” and, thus, trademark 
settlements are “favored in the law.”  Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 
50, 55-56, 60 (2d Cir. 1997).  Moreover, there is no “reverse-payment”—much less 
the type of “large and unjustified” reverse payment that Actavis indicated might fall 
within the antitrust construct.  See Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157 (size of reverse payment 
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indicator of “market power”); id. at 157-58 (antitrust claim more feasible because 
“the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for 
the patent’s weakness”).  Instead, nothing more is afoot here than settlements of non-
sham trademark claims that prohibit the infringing conduct in the same way that 
courts and parties routinely did.  Actavis does not permit the Commission to assert 
antitrust primacy in this everyday situation, deterring valid settlements and 
undermining trademark policy in the process.   
Even if antitrust should play some role, this Court should reject the 
Commission’s “drastic step” (Dissent 10) of deeming the trademark settlements 
presumptively unlawful so that it could satisfy its burden without ever “prov[ing] 
actual anticompetitive effects.”  Opinion of the Commission (“Op.”) 24.  Incredibly, 
the Commission adopted this evidentiary shortcut even after Actavis rejected it in 
much more extreme circumstances.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159.  In so doing, the 
Actavis Court cited California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999)—yet 
another Supreme Court case rejecting the Commission’s attempt to use inherently 
suspect analysis in a case involving advertising restrictions on price discounts and 
quality.  As Commissioner Phillips explained:  “Given that the California Dental 
Court applied the traditional rule of reason to analyze restraints with a more obvious 
anticompetitive impact, a fortiori, the restraints here should not be analyzed under a 
harsher standard.”  Dissent 12.         
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Once the “presumptively unlawful” moniker falls away—and the 
Commission is forced to face the traditional rule of reason—there is no way its claim 
can succeed.  The Commission claims that, even without its presumptively unlawful 
shortcut, there is “direct evidence” of anticompetitive effects.  This is a high burden 
that requires the Commission to prove that 1-800 Contacts’ agreements 
“significantly harm competition as a whole.”  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57; accord United 
States v. Am. Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 194 (2d Cir. 2016), aff’d, Ohio v. Am. 
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274 (2018).  The Commission cannot meet that burden 
when it does not contend 1-800 Contacts’ agreements restricted the output of 
contacts lenses, offers no evidence of a market-price effect or of 1-800 Contacts’ 
margins (much less that 1-800 Contacts maintained “abnormally high” margins, Am. 
Express, 838 F.3d at 205), and acknowledges that the market has grown consistently 
over the relevant period.    
Indeed, the Commission’s so-called “direct evidence” shows why it felt the 
need to invoke the presumptively unlawful shortcut in the first place.  First, the 
Commission claims there were fewer search ads displayed in response to 1-800 
Contacts’ trademarks.  But, as California Dental explained, the “question is not 
whether the universe of possible advertisements has been limited (as assuredly it 
has), but whether the limitation on advertisements obviously tends to limit” output 
of the underlying good or service.  526 U.S. at 776.  But far from limiting output, 
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competition here flourished and sales dramatically increased during the time of the 
challenged trademark agreements. 
Second, the Commission points to the fact that 1-800 Contacts generally had 
higher prices than some online competitors.  However, in a case about the 
importance of 1-800 Contacts’ brand, the Commission remarkably does not examine 
whether the higher prices could be caused by consumers’ preference for a strong 
brand, as opposed to a reduction in advertising (assuming such a reduction exists).  
Indeed, perhaps afraid of the results they would get, the Commission’s experts did 
not do any empirical analysis of prices at all, demonstrating the same “‘aversion to 
empirical evidence’ in favor of burden-shifting” that got the Ninth Circuit reversed 
after affirming the Commission in California Dental, 224 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
Because the Commission cannot prove significant harm to competition as a 
whole—the threshold question under the rule of reason—that should be the end of 
this case.  But the Commission also erred when it discounted 1-800 Contacts’ 
procompetitive justifications (protection of trademarks and efficiency of litigation 
settlements) and held the settlements should have been structured according to its 
preferences.  Specifically, over a decade after its first trademark settlement, the 
Commission told 1-800 Contacts that it should have settled with “disclosures,” 
instead of the “non-use” provisions that the parties to the agreements chose and that 
8 
courts regularly employed.  Op. 27.  As this Court said in the trademark context, “the 
parties are in the best position to determine what protections are needed and how to 
resolve” their disagreements, and, thus, it is “usually unwise for courts to second-
guess them.”  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 60.  Here, the Commission second-guessed the 
parties’ settlement structure even though it could not cite a single example of parties 
ever settling a trademark dispute the way it preferred.  This, too, requires reversal.   
 The Commission’s process for assigning antitrust liability was deeply flawed 
at every step and threatens to transform ordinary and competition-enhancing 
business practices into presumptive antitrust violations.  Trademark policy, like 
antitrust policy, aims to promote interbrand competition.  Continental T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (“Interbrand competition . . . is the 
primary concern of antitrust law”); Clorox, 117 F.3d at 61 (“Efforts to protect 
trademarks, even aggressive ones, serve the competitive purpose of furthering 
trademark policies.”).  The Commission’s short-sighted antitrust decision will 
undermine trademark policy and, in the long run, competition itself.  It should be 
reversed. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
On August 8, 2016, the Commission filed a complaint in its administrative 
court pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 3.11.  The Commission issued its opinion and a Final 
Order on November 7, 2018, and 1-800 Contacts filed a timely petition for review 
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with this Court on December 28, 2018.  This Court has jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(c).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Commission committed legal error by using antitrust law to
second-guess and condemn non-exclusionary trademark settlements that
arose from non-sham trademark claims and included the same relief that
district courts order for such claims.
2. Whether the Commission committed legal error by deeming non-exclusionary
trademark agreements “inherently suspect”—thus, avoiding the need to prove
anticompetitive effects in the market as a whole—despite the Supreme
Court’s repeated rejection of this evidentiary shortcut.
3. Whether the Commission committed legal error by misapplying the “direct
evidence” method to find anticompetitive effects where the “evidence” it
offered is consistent with the lawful, competition-enhancing exercise of
trademark rights.
4. Whether the Commission erred in finding that the 1-800 Contacts’ trademark
agreements harmed search engines by failing to offer any evidence of harm to
competition as a whole to sell advertising.
5. Whether the Commission committed legal error in rejecting 1-800 Contacts’
procompetitive justifications by (a) requiring proof that saved litigation costs
10 
from settlements were “passed on” to consumers and (b) inventing a “not good 
enough” standard to discount 1-800 Contacts’ asserted trademark claims. 
6. Whether the Commission committed legal error in its “less anticompetitive
means” analysis by failing to give “substantial weight” to the parties’ chosen
settlement terms and, instead, insisting on a “disclosure” provision that
(according to the Commission’s evidence) has never been used in any
trademark settlement.
7. Whether the Commission committed legal error by failing to analyze the
Luxottica agreement as a vertical sourcing agreement and finding that it
violated the antitrust laws without considering its unique competition-
enhancing benefits.
8. Whether the Commission’s Final Order, which interjects the Commission into
all of 1-800 Contacts’ trademark enforcement efforts regardless of their
context, is flawed and overly broad when the Commission’s theory of harm is
directed to trademark enforcement in the specific context of paid search
advertising.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On August 8, 2016, over a decade after 1-800 Contacts entered into its first 
trademark settlement, the Commission filed a complaint in its administrative court 
against 1-800 Contacts pursuant to 16 C.F.R. § 3.11.  The Complaint alleged the 
11 
provisions related to search advertising in several of 1-800 Contacts’ settlements and 
the Luxottica agreement (together, the “Challenged Agreements”) violated Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.   
The Commission’s claim against 1-800 Contacts was tried before 
Administrative Law Judge D. Michael Chappell (the “ALJ”) in an administrative 
trial beginning on April 11, 2017.  On October 20, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision 
finding that the Challenged Agreements violate Section 5 (interpreted coextensively 
with Section 1 of the Sherman Act) and entered a remedial order.   
On October 27, 2017, 1-800 Contacts timely appealed to the full Commission. 
On November 7, 2018, the Commission (in a three to one decision, with 
Commissioner Wilson not participating) affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion, but on 
different grounds.  On December 28, 2018, 1-800 Contacts timely filed a petition for 
review with this Court.   
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
It is hard to imagine a worse case for using antitrust law to condemn a valid 
exercise of trademark rights.  For many years, the market for contact lenses was 
dominated by eye-care professionals (“ECPs”) who, because of the lack of 
competition, charged high prices and had poor service.  1-800 Contacts cracked their 
stranglehold by investing hundreds of millions of dollars to build a powerful brand 
and an entirely new distribution channel.  As the dissent put it, “[t]his massive 
12 
endeavor—the kind of conduct trademark law is intended to foster—did more than 
benefit 1-800 Contacts:  it pioneered the mail-order contact lens business and then 
the online contact lens business to the direct benefit of consumers in the form of 
reduced prices and increased convenience and choice.”  Dissent 4.  
A. Key Features of the Contact Lens Industry.
Contact lenses are “medical devices” that effectively “are sold only pursuant
to prescription.”  Initial Decision Findings of Fact (“IDF”) 8-9.1  A consumer who 
wants to wear contact lenses must visit an ECP to obtain a prescription.  IDF 10. 
There are approximately 58,000 ECPs in the United States.  IDF 74.  In all but seven 
states, contact lens prescriptions expire in one year.  IDF 18.  This means that contact 
lens wearers must visit an ECP at least once a year (or every two years in a few 
states).  IDF 19.  ECPs use this mandated face-to-face interaction to their great 
advantage.  Even today, ECPs sell over 80 percent of initial contact lens orders under 
a new prescription and over 50 percent of refill orders.  IDF 404. 
For many years, ECPs were not required to provide customers a copy of their 
prescription.  See IDF 17.  During this period, unless the ECP voluntarily provided 
a customer with a prescription, customers had no practical choice but to purchase 
contact lenses from the ECP.  In 2003, in part at 1-800 Contacts’ urging, Congress 
1  For ease of reference, IDF citations are to the ALJ’s numbered findings of fact 
as opposed to page numbers. 
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passed the Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7601, which 
requires that ECPs automatically provide such prescriptions.  IDF 17.  Once a 
customer has a copy of the prescription, he or she can purchase the prescribed contact 
lenses from any retailer.  IDF 24-25.  Today, contact lenses are sold by independent 
ECPs, optical retail chains, mass merchandisers (e.g., Walmart, Target), club stores 
(e.g., Costco, Sam’s Club), purely online retailers, and other companies that sell 
through multiple channels.  IDF 73.     
In general, independent ECPs and optical retail chains (which themselves are 
often ECP-owned) charge the highest prices for contact lenses.  IDF 83, 431.  
Consistent with its market-disruption strategy, 1-800 Contacts has long priced at a 
discount to these market leaders.  IDF 433-34.  Other purely online retailers—which 
have not made the same brand investment as 1-800 Contacts—generally price at a 
discount to 1-800 Contacts.  IDF 442-44.  Club stores generally charge the lowest 
prices in the industry.  IDF 89, 448. 
 Even with increased prescription portability and the fact that a large portion 
of ECPs charge the highest prices in the industry, ECPs continue to dominate the 
sale of contact lenses.  Independent ECPs and optical retail chains command 
approximately 60 percent of contact lens sales in the United States, and when 
combined with mass merchandisers and club stores, account for 83 percent of 
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contact lens sales in the United States.2  IDF 491.  Online retailers, including 1-800 
Contacts, account for the remaining 17 percent.  IDF 491.  Between 2003 and 2015, 
the total sales of contact lenses at retail grew at four to five percent annually, 
reaching $4.7 billion in 2015.  IDF 4-5. 
B. 1-800 Contacts Pioneered the Sale of Contact Lenses Online. 
 In 1992, Jonathan Coon visited an ECP to purchase his contact lenses.  IDF 
31.  He found the process inconvenient, the service not very good, and the prices 
high.  IDF 31.  To Mr. Coon, this was not just a problem—it was an opportunity.  
From his college dorm room, Mr. Coon started the business that would become 1-
800 Contacts.  IDF 30.  Over the next decade—through risk-taking, massive brand-
building efforts, and a relentless focus on customer service—1-800 Contacts 
fundamentally changed the formerly stagnant retail market for contact lenses.   
 In the beginning, Mr. Coon’s company carried only four products, and it sold 
exclusively to college students living on campus.  IDF 33.  In 1995, Mr. Coon 
cobbled together the money to acquire the phone number “1-800 Contacts” and 
changed the name of the company to match the newly-acquired phone number.  IDF 
36.  1-800 Contacts’ sales more than doubled the first month after activating this 
phone number.  IDF 37.  Once 1-800 Contacts began advertising its new name and 
                                                 
2  Many mass merchandisers and club stores that sell contact lenses have ECPs in-
store (IDF 89) and are therefore included in this higher market share calculation.   
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phone number, its customer acquisition and retention rates jumped by 20 to 25 
percent.  IDF 51.  In 1996, 1-800 Contacts launched its website as one of the first 
companies (if not the first) to sell contact lenses online, and quickly became the 
pioneer of this new sales channel.  IDF 38.   
Advertising is central to 1-800 Contacts’ brand and value proposition.  1-800 
Contacts’ advertising spans a variety of media, including print, radio, television, and 
online.  In a little over a decade, 1-800 Contacts invested over $400 million in 
advertising across these platforms, which dwarfs the advertising spend of any of its 
online competitors.  IDF 582.  The goal of 1-800 Contacts’ advertising, as well as 
its customer service investments described below, is to “persuad[e] consumers to 
purchase a medical device like contact lenses from someone other than their ECP.”  
IDF 56. 
1-800 Contacts has achieved this objective, and did so primarily through
forms of advertising other than paid search advertising.  For example, between 2002 
and 2014, 1-800 Contacts spent  on television advertising alone, which 
is more the amount it spent on online advertising generally . 
IDF 64-66.  Over the same time period, 1-800 Contacts’ spend on paid search 
advertising made up just a fraction of its total online advertising spend  
.  IDF 66.  One reason 1-800 Contacts’ advertising spend is split this way is 
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that 1-800 Contacts has found television advertising drives customers to search for 
its website online.  IDF 63.      
1-800 Contacts’ massive advertising investments have paid off.  Despite the
ECPs’ natural advantage, 1-800 Contacts has earned the business of millions of 
customers, drawing them away from these expensive retailers to a lower-priced 
alternative (online sales) and an improved customer experience.  1-800 Contacts also 
has built the highest unaided brand awareness of any online retailer of contact lenses. 
IDF 581-82.  According to one analysis from 2015, 1-800 Contacts has 20 times the 
unaided brand recognition of its next largest online competitor.  IDF 414. 
1-800 Contacts has not stopped there.  It also has invested hundreds of
millions of dollars maintaining superior customer service to further build its brand 
and ensure its customers will come back.  For example, 1-800 Contacts continuously 
invests in website design to make its site simple and efficient.  Returning customers 
can place an order with as few as two clicks on 1-800 Contacts’ website.  IDF 39.  
1-800 Contacts also developed a mobile application that, among other features,
enables customers to submit prescription information by photo.  IDF 41-42.  To this 
day, calls to 1-800 Contacts are answered by a live person, usually by the third ring, 
and emails are answered within 10 minutes.  IDF 45. 
1-800 Contacts maintains—at great expense—the largest inventory stock of
any contact lens retailer.  IDF 44.  This inventory enables 1-800 Contacts to fill 98 
17 
percent of orders with inventory on hand rather than specially ordering contact lenses 
from manufacturers.  IDF 44.  1-800 Contacts also offers free replacement lenses if 
a customer tears a lens.  IDF 46.  These customer service efforts have led to 
numerous customer service awards.  IDF 47. 
After almost three decades in business, 1-800 Contacts sells about 10 percent 
of the contact lenses in the country and provides a credible alternative to purchasing 
contact lenses from an ECP.  IDF 492. 
C. Paid Search Advertising Mechanics.
This case is about one form of online advertising:  paid search advertising.  As
background, when a user enters a query into a search engine’s search bar, such as on 
Google, the search engine displays two sets of search results:  organic search results 
and paid search advertisements.  IDF 141.  Organic search results are displayed 
solely based on the search engine’s assessment of relevance to the user’s query.  IDF 
143. Advertisers do not (and cannot) pay the search engine when a user clicks on
an organic search result.  IDF 144. 
In contrast, the ranking and positioning of paid search ads largely depends on 
payments from advertisers to the search engines.  IDF 187.  To engage in paid search 
advertising, advertisers bid on specific “keywords” in “auctions.”  IDF 158-59.  In 
these auctions, an advertiser bids the highest amount that it is willing to pay if a user 
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searches for a specific word or phrase and then clicks on the advertiser’s ad that the 
search engine displays.  IDF 186.   
Search engines do not display paid search ads solely based on bids, however.  
IDF 184-85.  The number and positioning of paid search ads displayed in response 
to any given user query depends on a combination of advertiser bids and several 
other factors evaluated by the search engine.  IDF 202.  At present on Google, paid 
search ads appear immediately under the search bar and are marked with a small box 
that says “Ad.”  IDF 150.  The organic results appear below the paid search ads and, 
depending on the search, below a map.  Search engines may also display “product 
listing ads” (which are not generated in response to keyword bids).  IDF 271-74.      
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In addition to bids on keywords, advertisers choose the type of “matching” 
they want the search engine to use when determining whether to display an ad.  If 
the advertiser chooses “exact match,” the search engine displays an ad only if the 
user searches for the word or phrase on which the advertiser bid.  IDF 173.  For 
example, if an advertiser bid on “tennis shoes,” its ad would not be displayed when 
a user searches for “red tennis shoes.”  IDF 174.   
If an advertiser selects “broad match,” the search engine will seek to 
determine the meaning of the user’s search and display ads that it believes are 
relevant to the user’s intent.  IDF 167-68.  For example, if an advertiser bid on the 
keyword “low-carb diet plan,” a search engine might display an ad in response to 
searches for “carb-free foods.”  IDF 168.3  Search engines provide advertisers with 
the option to implement “negative keywords” to prevent ads from being displayed 
in response to searches for specific keywords.  IDF 175.  For example, an advertiser 
that sells eyeglasses could implement the negative keyword “wine glasses” to 
prevent its ads from being displayed when users search for “wine glasses.”  IDF 175.
  
                                                 
3  Search engines have other types of matching that fall between “exact match” and 
“broad match.”  IDF 169-72. 
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D. 1-800 Contacts’ Valuable Brand Was a Target for Trademark 
Infringement. 
 Because 1-800 Contacts has an extremely valuable brand, some of its 
competitors have infringed on its trademarks to reap the benefits of brand investment 
without themselves investing.  See IDF 301-02.  One way they have done so is by 
bidding on the trademarked term “1-800 Contacts” (and similar variants) in search 
advertising auctions so that their ads appear when a customer searches for “1-800 
Contacts.”  See IDF 302.  This practice was “directly correlated with” 1-800 
Contacts’ television advertising spend.  IDF 722.  In other words, the more 1-800 
Contacts spent on television ads to drive customers to its website, the more its free-
riding competitors bid on “1-800 Contacts” in search advertising auctions.  
Prior to 2004, this type of infringement was easy for 1-800 Contacts to 
resolve.  Google had a policy under which it would restrict, at a brand owner’s 
request, advertisers’ ability to bid on trademarked keywords.  IDF 287.  Google 
changed this policy in April 2004.  Google recognized that this policy change would 
lead to trademark infringement disputes, but nevertheless stated that it was “not in a 
position to arbitrate trademark disputes between advertisers and trademark owners.”  
IDF 293.  Google advised “trademark owners to resolve their disputes directly with 
advertisers.”  IDF 293. 
This policy change sparked an outcry among brand owners across industries, 
many of which spilled into litigation with competitors and Google itself.  See, e.g., 
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Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. 
Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).  To try to lessen this outrage, Google 
met with brand owners, including 1-800 Contacts, to discuss how they could resolve 
these disputes going forward.  CX9031-010.  Google suggested to 1-800 Contacts 
that it could resolve trademark disputes arising from this new policy by having 
alleged infringers implement 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks as negative keywords.  
CX9031-010 to 11.   
Bing followed a similar path as Google.  Bing initially did not permit 
advertisers to bid on trademarks as keywords, but changed its policy in 2011 to allow 
the practice.  IDF 296-98.   
E. 1-800 Contacts Settled a Series of Legitimate Trademark 
Infringement Lawsuits with Settlement Agreements that 
Prohibited the Infringing Conduct. 
 The search engines’ policy changes drove 1-800 Contacts and many other 
brand owners to litigate (or threaten litigation) with advertisers to resolve claims of 
trademark infringement based on trademark keyword bidding.  See IDF 301-16, 325, 
328-54; RX0734-096.  Between 2004 and 2013, 1-800 Contacts brought, or 
threatened to bring, several of these actions, 13 of which settled.  IDF 343.  The 
Commission concedes that every one of them was legitimate—i.e., not a sham.  Op. 
23.  Ultimately, instead of spending millions of dollars to litigate, 1-800 Contacts 
and the alleged infringers chose to settle these lawsuits based on the same relief 
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courts ordered for such claims—namely, “non-use” of the trademark terms in paid 
search advertising.  IDF 343, 359-70.  These settlements (the “Challenged 
Settlements”) are the purported antitrust sin giving rise to the Commission’s claims 
here.     
 Trademark Infringement Claims.  In the aftermath of Google’s 2004 policy 
change, and the flood of lawsuits that followed, courts began to grapple with legal 
issues surrounding trademark infringement lawsuits in this context.  One threshold 
question percolating through the courts was whether bidding on a trademarked 
keywords in search advertising was a “use in commerce” under the Lanham Act—
with most courts answering “yes.”4  IDF 333.  While this issue was working through 
the courts, between 2004 and 2008, 1-800 Contacts entered into three trademark 
settlements where its competitors agreed to stop engaging in the infringing conduct.  
IDF 307, 315, 344.  
 These trademark infringement claims were strengthened in April 2009, when 
this Court issued a decision confirming that bidding on trademarked keywords is a 
“use in commerce.”  Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 123; see also IDF 333.  Courts across 
                                                 
4  See, e.g., Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006); 
J.G. Wentworth S.S.C. Ltd. P’ship v. Settlement Funding LLC, No. 06-0597, 2007 
WL 30115, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 
330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 702-03 (E.D. Va. 2004). 
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the country adopted Rescuecom’s holding.5  IDF 333.  After Rescuecom, the focus 
of these trademark infringement cases shifted from the use of the trademarks to the 
likelihood of consumer confusion.  IDF 333.  Likelihood-of-confusion cases are fact-
intensive, expensive to litigate, and often require a judge or jury to resolve disputed 
facts, in part, because assessing likelihood of confusion involves detailed, multi-
factor tests.  IDF 334. 
Rescuecom considerably increased the risk that an alleged infringer would be 
found liable for infringement when bidding on a trademarked keyword because the 
prospects of dismissal on a threshold issue vanished.  IDF 333-34.  Most of the 
Challenged Settlements (9 of 13) occurred in the wake of Rescuecom, as the alleged 
infringers faced heightened liability and both sides faced the expense and burden of 
litigating the “confusion” question.  IDF 348.  In fact, only one month after 
Rescuecom, Judge George B. Daniels of the Southern District of New York 
memorialized one of 1-800 Contacts’ settlements as a permanent injunction.  
CX0316.   
As their own testimony makes plain, the alleged infringers settled because of 
the potential for liability and the costs of litigation outweighed any benefit from 
5  See, e.g., Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Sys. Concept, Inc., 638 F.3d 
1137, 1144 (9th Cir. 2011); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Mem’l Eye, P.A., No. 2:08-
CV-983, 2010 WL 988524, at *6 (D. Utah Mar. 15, 2010).
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continuing the allegedly infringing conduct.  IDF 352-54.  For example, Web Eye 
Care settled after Rescuecom because of the risks of losing the litigation and because 
the litigation costs were “not worth it.”  IDF 353.  Similarly, Memorial Eye agreed 
to settle in 2013 because of the legal uncertainty around the “broad matching issue,” 
and it knew “the Lens.com/1-800 Contacts case was still going on and they had spent 
$2 million.”6  IDF 349-50.  Everyone (including the Commission’s economist) 
agrees that parties act rationally when settling litigation.  IDF 356. 
 Settlement Terms.  While the terms of the Challenged Settlements are not 
identical, in general, the settlements prohibited the alleged infringer from bidding on 
a specifically-listed set of 1-800 Contacts’ trademark terms (and similar variants, 
including misspellings) in search advertising auctions.  See, e.g., IDF 363.7  Most of 
the Challenged Settlements also adopted Google’s suggestion:  they required the 
parties to implement negative keywords to prevent their ads from appearing in 
response to searches for the other party’s trademarked keywords, as those ads might 
be displayed under the search engines’ “broad match” instructions.  IDF 364.     
                                                 
6  In the Lens.com case, after six years of litigation and millions of dollars in legal 
expense, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Lens.com on 1-800 Contacts’ direct trademark infringement claims, 
while finding 1-800 Contacts had presented sufficient evidence on contributory 
infringement.  1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1256-57 
(10th Cir. 2013).   
7  1-800 Contacts also agreed not to bid on a specifically-listed set of the alleged 
infringers’ trademarks.  IDF 363.   
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Trademark non-use settlements are common in trademark infringement cases, 
including those involving infringement based on keyword bidding.  RX0734-107 to 
09 (collecting keyword infringement cases that settled with similar non-use 
provisions).  Search engines themselves settled cases with these same terms.  See, 
e.g., RX0732-0232 (settlement in which Yahoo agreed to block search ads that 
would be displayed in response to searches for American Airlines’ trademarks).  
That is not surprising, as many courts have entered injunctions based on the exact 
same relief—i.e., prohibiting alleged infringers from bidding on trademarked 
keywords in search advertising auctions and requiring negative keywords.  RX0734-
063-064, 099-107, 117-19 (collecting cases); see infra at 27-29 (chart of settlements 
and cases).   
Notably, the trademark settlements did not reach further than the 
infringement.  They targeted just one form of advertising—paid search advertising 
aimed at specific trademark terms.  Indeed, as one of the Commission’s experts 
admitted, “generic” terms—such as “contact,” “contact lenses,” or “discount 
contacts”—are more widely searched than trademark terms, and the Challenged 
Agreements did not touch these or other terms.  IDF 367; CX8007-028  
of searches were for generic terms, of searches were for 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademarks).  Nor did the agreements foreclose any other form of online advertising 
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services, including shipping contact lenses to Luxottica’s customers and retail stores, 
and other services, such as sourcing contact lenses from the major contact lens 
manufacturers.  IDF 394.  Because of this sourcing agreement,  
.  IDF 395.  Among the many 
terms in this collaborative agreement, 1-800 Contacts and Luxottica agreed to terms 
similar to those contained in the Challenged Settlements.  That is, 1-800 Contacts 
and Luxottica agreed not to bid on one another’s trademarks in search advertising 
auctions and to implement negative keywords.  IDF 396.    
G. Over the Period that 1-800 Contacts Entered the Challenged 
Agreements, Competition to Sell Contact Lenses Dramatically 
Increased and  
Under the Commission’s theory that the Challenged Agreements enacted 
oppressive advertising restrictions, one would expect to see stagnating growth in the 
contact lens market and reduced competition to sell contact lenses.  The opposite 
occurred.  Since the first trademark settlement in 2004, the contact lens market grew 
by four to five percent annually.  See, e.g., IDF 4-5.  More online contact lens sellers 
were founded.  See, e.g., IDF 106, 111, 117.  More brick-and-mortar retailers 
expanded their online offerings.  IDF 90-97.  And even today, new companies 
frequently come into the market.  IDF 123-34.   
In fact, the Commission does not (and cannot) make any claim that the 
Challenged Agreements restricted output or harmed the quality of contact lenses.  
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Nor does the Commission suggest 1-800 Contacts has been able to grow its margins 
due to the Challenged Agreements.  To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that 
 even before any of the Challenged 
Agreements existed.  RX0739-064, 107; Dissent 34. 
None of this is surprising because, despite the Commission’s effort to inflate 
the importance of paid search advertising using trademarked terms, that is just one 
of many forms of advertising.  To be sure, 1-800 Contacts’ competitors may have 
appreciated advertising using the brand that 1-800 Contacts spent hundreds of 
millions of dollars building.  But the record does not support (and the Commission 
does not contend) that 1-800 Contacts’ competitors were unable to compete without 
being able to use 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks in a potentially infringing way.   
H. The ALJ and Commission Opinions.   
 ALJ Opinion.  On October 20, 2017, the ALJ issued an Initial Decision (“ID”) 
finding that the Challenged Agreements violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.  See ID at 190.  The ALJ applied the traditional three-part burden-
shifting framework under the rule of reason.  ID at 123-189.  As to anticompetitive 
effects, the ALJ arbitrarily limited the “market” to only online retailers (excluding 
sellers that make up to 83 percent of contacts lens sales from this “market”) and 
found at “least some consumers” in this “market” paid higher prices due to the 
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Challenged Agreements.  ID at 152-53.  The ALJ found that the procompetitive 
benefits offered by 1-800 Contacts did not outweigh those “effects.”  ID at 190.   
 Commission Majority Opinion.  On November 7, 2018, a Commission 
majority affirmed the ALJ’s finding of liability, but went much further—adopting 
virtually every argument its staff put forward and creating new (and dangerous) 
antitrust rules.   
First, the Commission held that Actavis did not forbid second-guessing of 
these settlements.  Op. 15.  Indeed, according to the Commission, it was not bound 
by the “Actavis considerations” at all.  Op. 15.  
Second, unlike the ALJ, the Commission applied the rarely-used “inherently 
suspect” standard to analyze the Challenged Agreements.  Op. 18.  Under this 
truncated analysis, the Commission can discharge its initial burden by showing that 
the “nature of the restraints” is anticompetitive and recognized as such by economic 
theory.  Op. 19-20.  Without citing a single source addressing trademarks, 
settlements, or search advertising, the Commission claimed that the inherently 
suspect standard applies to any agreement that regulates “the display of ads that 
would enable consumers to learn about alternative sellers . . . and give them the 
opportunity to make price comparisons at the time they are likely to make a 
purchase.”  Op. 22.   
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 It then recognized that 1-800 Contacts had offered plausible and cognizable 
competition-enhancing justifications for the Challenged Agreements:  saved 
litigation costs and trademark protection.8  Op. 22-24.  Yet, instead of reverting to a 
full rule of reason analysis (as Second Circuit law requires), it used an analysis under 
which it “still need not prove actual anticompetitive effects.”  Op. 24. (citation 
omitted).  In the Commission’s view, it wins under the inherently suspect standard 
after any procompetitive justification has been identified by merely “(i) identifying 
a theoretical basis for the alleged anticompetitive effects and showing that these 
effects are likely in this particular setting or (ii) explaining how [1-800 Contacts] 
could have minimized the anticompetitive effects of its conduct or accomplished its 
procompetitive justifications through less restrictive alternatives.”  Op. 24-25.  The 
Commission held that it made both showings.   
 Third, in the alternative to its “inherently suspect” analysis, the Commission 
purported to find “direct evidence” of anticompetitive effects.  Op. 42.  The 
Commission found two forms of “direct evidence”:  (1) the Challenged Agreements 
reduced the number of ads displayed in response to queries on search engines for 1-
800 Contacts’ trademarks; and (2) absent the Challenged Agreements, some 
                                                 
8  The majority later determined that these procompetitive justifications were not 
“valid.”  Op. 36.   
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consumers searching for “1-800 Contacts” might have seen additional ads and 
purchased at a lower price.  Op. 42-47. 
 Fourth, the Commission held that the search engines—Google and 
Microsoft—were victims of the Challenged Agreements, and that harm to them was 
also “direct evidence” of anticompetitive effects.  Op. 50-54.       
Commissioner Phillips’ Dissent.  Commissioner Phillips issued a blistering 
46-page dissent—one of the longest in Commission history.    
He criticized the majority for not adhering to this Court’s Clorox decision—a 
case “on all fours” with this one.  Dissent 18.  That case, as Commissioner Phillips 
explained, rejected an antitrust challenge to trademark settlement agreements 
because “trademarks are by their nature non-exclusionary” and “efforts to protect 
trademarks, even aggressive ones, serve the competitive purpose of furthering 
trademark policies.”  Dissent 16-20 (quoting Clorox, 117 F.3d at 55-56, 61).  
 Commissioner Phillips also excoriated the majority’s “drastic” decision to 
apply an inherently suspect standard to effectively any restriction on advertising.  As 
he explained, that is fundamentally inconsistent with Actavis, Clorox, California 
Dental, and other case law, and it also is profoundly bad policy.  Dissent 10-21 
(decision will “create uncertainty, dilute trademark rights, and dampen inter-brand 
competition”).   
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 Commissioner Phillips was equally critical of the Commission’s purported 
“direct evidence” of anticompetitive effects.  Dissent 29-35.  With respect to the 
Commission’s first piece of evidence—a reduction in the number of ads displayed 
in response to searches for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks—Commissioner Phillips 
explained that the relevant output for this purpose is not the amount of advertising 
in the world, but of the underlying good sold.  Dissent 30-31 (citing Cal. Dental, 526 
U.S. at 776).  And here, the Commission does not contend that the output of contact 
lenses was restricted.  ID at 153 n.36.   
 As to the second piece of evidence, Commissioner Phillips explained that the 
majority’s analysis “rests almost entirely on the unremarkable fact that 1-800 
Contacts’ prices were higher than some of its competitors’ prices.”  Dissent 32.  
Commissioner Phillips faulted the majority for failing to account for the fact (1) that 
this price gap pre-dated any of the Challenged Agreements and (2) that 1-800 
Contacts’  regardless of the number of Challenged 
Agreements in place.  Dissent 32-33.  Moreover, he noted that the majority did not 
even consider that consumer preference for an established company with a strong 
brand could account for the price differential.  Dissent 33 & n.44.9   
                                                 
9  For similar reasons, Commissioner Phillips criticized the Commission’s holding 
that the Challenged Agreements harmed search engines.  Dissent at 38-42.   
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission’s decision to apply antitrust scrutiny and its antitrust 
analysis are rife with legal errors requiring reversal. 
First, the Commission erred in holding that the Challenged Settlements are 
subject to antitrust scrutiny.  Actavis narrowly permitted antitrust second-guessing 
of “unusual” reverse-payment patent settlements that completely excluded 
competitors from the market, while exempting commonplace settlements based on 
traditional settlement considerations.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 152, 156.  The settlements 
in this case should not be subject to antitrust scrutiny, as they are non-exclusionary 
trademark settlements that contain no reverse payment or other “unusual” structure 
and instead employ the same relief courts commonly granted in adjudicating the 
same claims.      
Second, the Commission erred in applying the “inherently suspect” standard.  
The Commission’s reasoning means that virtually any restriction on advertising is 
inherently suspect.  But the Supreme Court rejected that rule 20 years ago in 
California Dental and, more recently, rejected application of the inherently suspect 
standard to exclusionary, reverse-payment settlements in Actavis.  The 
Commission’s third attempt to avoid the ordinary rule of reason, in a case presenting 
no threat to competition, should not be the proverbial charm.   
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Third, to show anticompetitive effects under the correct legal analysis, the 
Commission was required to prove “higher prices, reduced output, or lower quality 
in the market as a whole.”  MacDermid Printing Sols. LLC v. Cortron Corp., 833 
F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2016).  The Commission failed to prove any of this.  It does 
not claim that the Challenged Agreements reduced output of contact lenses, offered 
no evidence that the Challenged Agreements caused the quality of contact lenses to 
decrease, and failed to prove any relevant price effect because, among other things, 
it offered no evidence about 1-800 Contacts’ margins, let alone evidence that its 
margins were “abnormally high.”  Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 205.   
In place of proof of harm to competition, the Commission offered two pieces 
of “direct evidence” that are indistinguishable from the competition-enhancing 
exercise of 1-800 Contacts’ trademark rights.  As a matter of law, a mere reduction 
in advertising (the first piece of “evidence”) is not an anticompetitive effect where 
there is no proven output effect in the underlying market.  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 
776.  Moreover, as a matter of fact, the Commission offered no proof that the 
Challenged Agreements reduced the amount of advertising, or even search 
advertising, for contact lenses.   
The other form of direct evidence is essentially that 1-800 Contacts maintains 
higher prices than some online competitors.  The Commission concedes that 1-800 
Contacts has superior customer service, but claims that this superior service does not 
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“fully account” for the difference.  But in a case about 1-800 Contacts’ strong brand, 
the Commission does not even consider that consumer preference for this strong 
brand (or any other factor) could account for the rest.  The Commission’s “evidence” 
that certain transactions were affected by 1-800 Contacts’ exercise of its trademark 
rights does not come close to establishing harm to competition in the market as a 
whole. 
Fourth, for similar reasons, the Commission failed to show harm to search 
engines.  The Commission’s finding of anticompetitive harm to the search engines 
is even more galling considering that the search engines told 1-800 Contacts to enter 
the Challenged Agreements to resolve the disputes they caused and disclaimed 
knowledge that the Challenged Agreements harmed them.   
Fifth, beyond its failure to prove anticompetitive effects, the Commission 
erred in (1) discounting 1-800 Contacts’ procompetitive justifications and (2) 
demanding that parties only use its proposed settlement term (“disclosures”) under 
the guise of “less anticompetitive means.”  Clorox demands that the parties’ choice 
of settlement terms be given “substantial weight,” but the Commission gave their 
choice no weight—even though it could not identify any trademark settlement using 
its preferred settlement structure in the real world.   
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Commission’s conclusions of law and application of law to facts are 
reviewed de novo.  FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986).  The 
Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.  
Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1062 (11th Cir. 2005).   
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION ERRED BY APPLYING ANTITRUST 
SCRUTINY TO COMMONPLACE TRADEMARK SETTLEMENTS. 
Actavis does not support the Commission’s new rule.  Settling a trademark 
lawsuit to block a potentially infringing advertisement cannot be a plausible antitrust 
violation that is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and expose the settling party 
to potentially ruinous liability or, at minimum, notoriously expensive antitrust 
discovery.  15 U.S.C. § 15(a); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).  
If allowed to stand, this rule will deter efficient settlements and undermine trademark 
policy and brand investments.  By doing so, it will thwart the very interbrand 
competition that antitrust and trademark law are supposed to promote.   
A. Actavis Permits Antitrust Scrutiny of Non-Sham Settlements Only 
in Extremely Narrow Circumstances. 
Almost two decades ago, the Commission began a controversial quest to 
condemn an “unusual” type of IP settlement—reverse-payment patent settlements—
under antitrust law.  See In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 
WL 1488085, at *87-88 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002).  These settlements arose in the 
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context of a “unique” “drug-regulatory framework established” by the Hatch-
Waxman Act.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 142, 155-56.   
Under this Act, the first generic drug manufacturer that files an abbreviated 
new drug application—and successfully challenges a pioneer’s patent—is granted a 
“generic exclusivity” period in which to sell its generic product in competition with 
the pioneer.  Id. at 144.  This exclusivity is potentially worth “several hundred 
million” dollars in profits to the generic manufacturer; at the same time, the generic’s 
entry threatens the pioneer’s monopoly.  Id. at 143-44.  According to the 
Commission, this situation presented an opportunity for collusion:  the patent-
infringement plaintiff (the pioneer drug manufacturer) could pay the allegedly 
infringing defendant (the generic manufacturer) millions of dollars in a settlement 
so the generic would stay out the market, effectively permitting the parties to split 
the monopoly profits.  Id. at 155-56 (citing 12 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust 
Law ¶ 2046 at 341 (3d ed. 2010) (Hatch-Waxman structure creates “special 
incentives for collusion”).  These reverse-payment settlements became the 
battleground at the intersection of antitrust, IP, and settlement principles.  
But many courts rejected the Commission’s suggestion that antitrust was a 
valid tool to second-guess even these exclusionary, unusual settlements.  See, e.g., 
Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 202-03; Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065.  For example, 
in Tamoxifen, this Court reiterated its “longstanding adherence to the principle that 
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‘courts are bound to encourage’ the settlement of litigation” and recognized that 
using antitrust to second-guess these settlements would not only discourage 
settlements generally—it also would undermine patent policy itself.  Tamoxifen, 466 
F.3d at 202 (citation omitted).
Moreover, as this Court explained, there is simply no way to “guess” how a 
patent infringement claim would have turned out absent the settlement and, thus, 
could not base an antitrust determination on the strength of the underlying patent 
claim.  Id. at 204.  For these reasons and others, this Court aligned itself with the 
Eleventh Circuit in holding that, so long as the exclusionary effects of the settlement 
did not “exceed the scope of the patent’s protection,” id. at 218, there is no antitrust 
claim absent other circumstances (like sham litigation or a patent procured by fraud). 
In other words, “[w]hatever damage is done to competition by settlement is done 
pursuant to the monopoly extended to the patent holder by patent law unless the 
terms of the settlement enlarge the scope of that monopoly.”  Id. at 212-13. 
Unhappy with these adverse decisions, the Commission sought review by the 
Supreme Court, ultimately leading to Actavis.  In briefing Actavis, the Commission 
assured the Supreme Court that it had no reason to fear an antitrust assault on IP 
settlements generally because it was narrowly focused on the heightened 
competition risks and problems associated with “unusual” reverse-payment patent 
settlements.   
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For example, the Commission emphasized that “it is well-established” that 
patent settlements “do not generally violate the antitrust laws,” and, “while a Hatch-
Waxman settlement without a reverse payment should ordinarily raise no antitrust 
concern, there are sound reasons to treat reverse-payment settlements differently.”  
See FTC Actavis Br. at 16, 26.  But reverse-payment settlements, according to the 
Commission, were nothing more than a payment to “stay out of the market”—
normally a per se violation of antitrust law.  Id. at 20.  In these circumstances, the 
Commission advocated that antitrust scrutiny should not only be permitted, but the 
settlements should be deemed presumptively unlawful.  Id. at 19-22. 
A divided Supreme Court narrowly permitted antitrust scrutiny of these 
reverse-payment settlements, while rejecting the Commission’s effort to apply a 
presumptively unlawful standard (more on this below).  The majority recognized the 
“value of settlements” and the “patent litigation problem”—i.e., that a hindsight 
analysis of fact-intensive claims is difficult and unreliable.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153.  
But the Court determined those factors should not “determine the results here,” and 
that unique “considerations lead us to conclude that the FTC should have been given 
the opportunity to prove its antitrust claim” in this context.  Id. at 153 (emphasis 
added).   
The foremost “consideration” was that these patent settlements went to the 
heart of antitrust’s concern:  exclusion of competition from the market.  Id. at 153-
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54 (noting a “payment in return for staying out of the market” keeps prices at 
monopoly levels); see also id. at 146 (“Patent holders have a lawful right to exclude 
others from the market; thus a patent conveys the right to cripple competition”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations excluded).  The other “considerations” 
flowed from the unique nature of reverse-payment settlements.  Id. at 153-58 
(citation omitted).  For example, the majority noted that (1) a large, reverse payment 
is typically an indicator of “market power,” and (2) the “size of the unexplained 
reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a patent’s weakness, all 
without forcing a court to conclude a detailed exploration of the validity of the patent 
itself.”  Id. at 157-58.  Thus, the majority believed an “antitrust action is likely to 
prove more feasible administratively” in that context.  Id. at 157.  Throughout its 
opinion, the majority noted that the need for antitrust scrutiny was driven by the 
Hatch-Waxman structure, which creates “special incentives for collusion” and 
effectively ensures that, if the first-to-file generics are paid off to stay out of the 
market, other generics will not have the same incentive to challenge the patent.  Id. 
at 156.    
But the majority did not intend to open the floodgates to allow antitrust attack 
of IP settlements generally.  To the contrary, the majority was careful to cabin its 
extension of antitrust scrutiny to this type of “unusual” reverse-payment settlement 
to avoid implicating “commonplace” settlements that did not carry the same risks.  
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Id. at 147-48, 152.  Thus, the majority made clear that settlements “reflecting 
traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation costs” should not be 
subject to the same antitrust scrutiny.  Id. at 156.  And, the majority tried to comfort 
the dissenters by making unambiguous that, “[i]nsofar as the dissent urges that 
settlements taking these commonplace forms have not been thought for that reason 
alone subject to antitrust liability, we agree, and do not intend to alter that 
understanding.”  Id. at 152.   
The dissenters, however, were deeply troubled by even this limited extension 
of antitrust law.  They recognized that “there would be no incentive to settle if, 
immediately after settling, the parties would have to litigate the same issue—the 
question of patent validity—as part of a defense against an antitrust suit.”  Id. at 170.  
The dissenters famously wished district courts “good luck” in figuring out how to 
apply antitrust’s amorphous standards to reverse-payment patent settlements in the 
future.  Id. at 173.  The resulting uncertainty from this “novel” application of antitrust 
law, the dissenters explained, “weakens the protections afforded to innovators by 
patents, frustrates the public policy in favor of settling, and likely undermines the 
very policy [the majority] seeks to promote . . . .”  Id. at 176.  Ominously, the 
dissenters then presaged this case, “fear[ing] the Court’s attempt to limit its holding 
to the context of patent settlements . . . will not hold long.”  Id. at 170.      
45 
B. The Challenged Settlements Do Not Implicate any of the Concerns
that Led the Actavis Court to Narrowly Extend Antitrust Scrutiny.
The dissenters were right, as the Commission (contrary to its briefing in 
Actavis) was not content to assert antitrust primacy over just exclusionary patent 
settlements based on a large, unjustified reverse-payments.  Instead, in this case, the 
Commission upended Actavis’s limited holding in favor of a dangerous rule that 
permits limitless antitrust scrutiny of trademark, and perhaps all IP, settlements.  In 
doing so, the Commission has gone way too far.     
 This case is, if anything, the opposite of Actavis.  First, because “trademarks 
are by their nature non-exclusionary,” Clorox, 117 F.3d at 56, trademark agreements 
do not create the same risk to competition as patent settlements that block 
competitors entirely from the market.  Indeed, precisely because of their non-
exclusionary nature, this Court held that trademark settlements are “favored in the 
law” and that it is “usually unwise for courts to second-guess” them.  Id. at 60.   
The Challenged Settlements here are no exception.  Like most trademark 
agreements, the parties could “escape the clutches” of the Challenged Settlements 
through many other forms of advertising—including in paid search advertising so 
long as they used different words (as occurred over a billion times during the relevant 
period).10  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57 (internal citations omitted).  Further, far from 
10  During the relevant period, Google alone displayed over  paid search 
ads related to contact lenses for the counterparties to the Challenged Agreements 
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excluding competition and preserving a monopoly, the market for selling contact 
lenses became more competitive during the time of the Challenged Agreements, as 
more online sellers penetrated the market and overall output increased.  See, e.g., 
IDF 4, 96, 106, 111, 117, 126, 127, 129, 133.   
Second, the Challenged Settlements here do not involve a “large, unjustified 
reverse payment,” or anything like it.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 158.  The few settlements 
that have monetary terms require payments from the alleged infringer to 1-800 
Contacts—payments in the opposite direction of the “unusual” structure in Actavis.  
See CX0311; CX0313; CX0314; CX0315; CX0323; CX0324.  Moreover, it is 
undisputed that (1) the “non-use” provision at the heart of these settlements regularly 
appeared in trademark settlements resolving trademark search advertising claims; 
and (2) courts ordered “non-use” as a remedy for such claims.  This is critical 
because, as the Commission itself recognized in Actavis, the “extraordinary and 
distinguishing feature” of the settlements there was that the “defendant generic 
manufacturers receive something—a substantial cash payment from the brand-name 
(i.e., not including ads for 1-800 Contacts).  RX0739-0098.  And Google 
displayed over  paid search ads for contact lenses for retailers that 
were not party to any trademark agreement.  RX0739-0099.   
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manufacturer that holds a patent—that they could not hope to obtain even if they 
prevailed in litigation.”  FTC Actavis Br. at 30.11        
In this everyday settlement context, any antitrust scrutiny is misguided.  
Without a “large and unjustified reverse payment,” there is no basis to infer market 
power or that the Challenged Settlements accomplished an anticompetitive end.  
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157.  Nor is there any objective, reliable way to conduct a post-
hoc assessment of the underlying trademark claims.  Id. at 157-58.  Indeed, as the 
Commission majority conceded, it was inappropriate to “decid[e] matters of 
trademark law in the antitrust analysis” here.  Op. 40.  But it then did exactly that, 
holding that 1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims were an insufficient procompetitive 
justification unless they met “some minimal threshold of validity—more than merely 
surviving challenges as shams.”  Op. 40.  The majority then spent multiple pages 
                                                 
11  In light of this position in Actavis, it is disingenuous for the Commission majority 
to suggest here that a court’s ability to order the same injunctive relief as reflected 
in 1-800 Contacts’ settlements (“non-use” of trademarks) is “irrelevant” to the 
antitrust analysis.  Op. 14.  The Commission also claims the settlements were 
“unusual” and nefarious because they “effectively eliminat[ed] an entire channel 
of competitive advertising.”  Op. 14.  That is plainly not true.  At most, the 
Challenged Settlements regulate how the parties can use certain trademarked 
words in one narrow channel of competitive advertising.  The parties were free 
to, and did, engage in competitive paid search advertising using countless other 
keywords, supra n.10, or other forms of advertising. 
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weaving through trademark case law to suggest 1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims 
failed to meet this amorphous “not good enough” standard.  Op. 38-41.  The fact that 
the Commission felt the need to deny that it was deciding the trademark question, 
when it transparently did just that, only highlights the undeniable reality:  unlike in 
the unusual Actavis context, there is no way to apply antitrust principles to 
commonplace trademark settlements without a post-hoc analysis of trademark 
claims.  And, as everyone agrees, that is not something courts applying antitrust 
principles are well-situated to do.  Actavis, 570 U.S at 153; Op. 16.   
Third, in Actavis, the Court was concerned that the “unique regulatory 
framework” distorted the ordinary incentives of litigants, which otherwise are 
presumed to act rationally in litigating and settling.  570 U.S. at 155-56.  Indeed, the 
regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act created incentives for the parties 
to do something “virtually unheard of” elsewhere:  settle with a reverse payment 
(i.e., a payment from the plaintiff to defendant), which is relief that courts could not 
provide in patent litigation.  Moreover, the regulatory structure removed the 
incentive for subsequent parties to challenge the patent, ensuring that any agreement 
to split monopoly rents would remain safe.  Id. at 155-56.        
No such distortion is present here.  There is no dispute that the parties 
negotiating the Challenged Settlements were acting rationally and in their own best 
interests.  If advertising on 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks was material to any of the 
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counterparties’ ability to compete, they would have continued litigating the 
trademark claims that 1-800 Contacts was pursuing (especially if the claims were as 
weak as the Commission contends), instead of settling by giving up that ability and 
sometimes paying 1-800 Contacts.  But instead of continuing to litigate, the parties 
here indisputably weighed the normal settlement considerations (risk of liability and 
litigation expense) and reached a settlement based on a term that courts could—and 
did—order.    
As the Commission itself recently made clear in its first post-Actavis case, it 
is the existence of a reverse payment that “triggers antitrust scrutiny.”  Op. of the 
Comm’n at 6, In the Matter of Impax Labs., Inc., Docket No. 9373 (Mar. 28, 2019).12  
Here, there is no reverse payment (much less a “large and unjustified” one), no 
market exclusion, and no distorting regulatory structure.  All that is at issue here is 
1-800 Contacts’ good-faith effort to protect its trademarks through commonplace 
settlements.  At least where, as here, (1) every one of the trademark challenges 
                                                 
12  This rule is consistent with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s 
principles for IP licensing.  Makan Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Remarks Prepared for Delivery 
at University of Pennsylvania Law School: The “New Madison” Approach to 
Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law (Mar. 16, 2018) at 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/file/1044316/download.  Those principles 
state that the unilateral refusal to license IP is per se lawful.  Id. at 15-16.  That 
would be a craven promise if an IP owner was exposed to antitrust liability 
because it settled a case to prevent infringement.  
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underlying the settlements was legitimate and not a sham; and (2) the “non-use” 
provisions reflect the same relief ordered by courts in trademark infringement cases 
and do not reach beyond the alleged infringement, the ordinary rule that antitrust 
must yield to procompetitive trademark policy should govern.  See, e.g., Actavis, 
570 U.S. at 156; Deere & Co. v. MTD Holdings, Inc., No. 00 CIV. 5936 (LMM), 
2004 WL 1794507, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2004) (aggressive, non-sham 
trademark enforcement efforts “simply do not amount to antitrust violations or 
misuse”); Weber v. Nat’l Football League, 112 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673 (N.D. Ohio 
2000) (“The weight of the authority dictates that legal efforts to protect trademark 
rights simply do not constitute a restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws.”); 
Letica Corp. v. Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. Supp. 702, 706 (E.D. Mich. 1992).      
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN APPLYING THE “INHERENTLY 
SUSPECT” STANDARD TO VIRTUALLY ELIMINATE ITS 
EVIDENTIARY BURDEN. 
Lacking the ability to prove that 1-800 Contacts’ exercise of its trademark 
rights caused anticompetitive effects “in the market as a whole,” MacDermid, 833 
F.3d at 182, the Commission takes, in the words of Commissioner Phillips’ dissent, 
the “[d]rastic [s]tep” of applying the rarely-used “inherently suspect” standard 
(synonymous with the “quick look” and “presumptively unlawful” standards).  
Dissent 10.  By applying this standard, the Commission presumed the Challenged 
Agreements were unlawful and freed itself from its initial burden of proving that the 
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Challenged Agreements caused market-wide anticompetitive effects.  This low 
standard accepts theories and suspicion in place of evidence and, therefore, could 
result in near-summary condemnation of competition-enhancing conduct.  The 
Commission’s stubborn insistence on using this standard, despite repeatedly being 
told by courts not to, should once again be rejected.   
A. The Inherently Suspect Standard Does Not Apply Under Actavis, 
Clorox, and California Dental. 
Because the inherently suspect standard truncates the antitrust analysis and 
can lead to near-summary condemnation, the Supreme Court has erected a high 
barrier to its application.  As the Commission recognizes, only conduct akin to a per 
se illegal violation of antitrust law (like price-fixing) should be judged under this 
truncated standard.  Op. 19.  Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice recently 
cautioned against courts applying this standard, explaining it is only for “rare cases.”  
Corrected Statement of Interest, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. Case 2:18-cv-
00244-SAB, at 17 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 8, 2019) (emphasis added).   
The inherently suspect standard—and its presumption of anticompetitive 
effects—applies only where an arrangement is so obviously anticompetitive that “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that 
the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets.”  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.  Before applying this standard, courts must 
ensure there is ample judicial experience and economic learning to confidently 
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predict the arrangement’s competition-destroying effects.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159; 
see Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. 
Trying to make things easier on itself, the Commission repeatedly has tried to 
trigger this presumption of illegality, and repeatedly failed.  Just five years before 
the Commission’s opinion here, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the 
Commission’s attempt to apply this truncated standard to the much more extreme 
facts of Actavis—a case involving a patent settlement that entirely blocked 
competitors from the market and had “unusual” terms that, in the Court’s view, 
plausibly suggested weakness in the underlying patent.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159-
160.  The Commission claims that Actavis does not completely foreclose the use of 
a presumption in evaluating an IP settlement, Op. 35, but even if true, Actavis 
“clearly does not support treating less egregious restrictions” in this case “as 
presumptively unlawful.”  Dissent 13; see also Wright Article at 6 (“We find it 
unlikely that an appellate court following Actavis closely would be willing to apply 
a truncated analysis to the settlement agreements at issue here.”).  Indeed, Clorox, a 
case involving a non-use trademark agreement between competitors, made clear that 
trademarks “are by their nature non-exclusionary” because “[a] trademark, unlike 
other intellectual property rights, does not confer a legal monopoly on any good or 
idea; it confers rights to a name only.”  117 F.3d at 56; see also Dissent 18 (Clorox 
is “on all fours with this case”).  A trademark settlement does not stop a competitor 
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from producing or marketing products, and a party to a trademark agreement can 
“escape [its] clutches” simply by using a different name.  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57 
(internal citations omitted); accord Dissent 21.  Thus, far from suggesting the 
Commission can presume a trademark settlement is anticompetitive, Clorox holds 
that “it is difficult to show that an unfavorable trademark agreement raises antitrust 
concerns” at all.  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57.  Only by showing “actual adverse effects 
on competition as a whole” is there is any possible antitrust concern.  Id. at 56.   
To adopt the Commission’s inherently suspect standard, this Court would 
have to overrule Clorox.  This case, however, proves the wisdom of Clorox’s 
teachings.  The Challenged Agreements here do not prevent the parties from selling 
contact lenses or advertising those products—they simply prohibit one narrow form 
of advertising.  Id. at 57.  In fact, during the relevant period, contact lens sales 
increased at four to five percent annually, more online retailers of contact lens were 
founded, brick-and-mortar retailers expanded their online offerings, the parties to 
the Challenged Agreements engaged in advertising, including search advertising, 
and the market was (and is) characterized by vigorous competition.  See, e.g., IDF 
4, 5, 96, 106, 111, 117, 124, 127, 129, 133.  Clorox correctly recognizes that 
trademark agreements (like those here) present little risk to competition and derive 
from important trademark policies; thus, they should be respected—not 
presumptively condemned.  See Clorox, 117 F.3d at 55 (“We begin with the fact that 
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Clorox challenges a trademark agreement.  Such agreements are common, and 
favored, under the law.”).   
Ignoring the teachings of Actavis and Clorox, the Commission nevertheless 
announces a new rule that any limitation on the “display of ads that would enable 
consumers to learn about alternative sellers . . . and give them the opportunity to 
make price comparisons at the time they are likely to make a purchase” is inherently 
suspect.  Op. 22.  But that rule contradicts yet additional Supreme Court precedent, 
which the Commission also cavalierly disregards.     
As the Supreme Court recently held, affirming this Court, there is “nothing 
inherently anticompetitive” about even broad restrictions on the ability of sellers to 
inform consumers about lower-priced options at the point of sale (i.e., the time 
consumers are likely to make a purchase) where the restraints have the potential to 
increase interbrand competition and preserve investments.  Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2289; see also Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Ents., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (applying the full rule of reason to a horizontal agreement not to compete 
that prevented the competitors from free riding off one another’s advertising).  
Indeed, the Commission is simply reasserting the rule that it was unable to persuade 
the Supreme Court of 20 years ago in California Dental:  that advertising 
regulations, as a category, are inherently suspect.   
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California Dental specifically rejected the Commission’s attempt to apply the 
quick look standard to a broad advertising ban on price and quality implemented by 
a dentist association.  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 771.  And, as Commissioner Phillips 
wrote, “[g]iven that the California Dental Court applied the traditional rule of reason 
to analyze restraints with a more obvious anticompetitive impact, a fortiori, the 
restraints here should not be analyzed under a harsher standard.”  Dissent 12.  The 
Commission claims that California Dental stands for the proposition that evidentiary 
shortcuts are inappropriate where “the normal linkage between advertising 
restrictions and price/output effects in the underlying product market [is] 
attenuated.”  Op. 42.  Yet it fails to consider that the limited nature of the Challenged 
Agreements and their roots in trademark law and good-faith litigation settlements 
sever this linkage.13  Indeed, the Commission does not contend that the Challenged 
Agreements reduced the output of contact lenses, which would be the ordinary result 
if the Challenged Agreements were anticompetitive.  ID at 153 n.36.   
                                                 
13  The Commission recognizes that search advertising is a “comparatively recent” 
phenomenon taking place within an “evolving marketplace economy.”  Op. 2.  
That recognition is fundamentally inconsistent with application of the inherently 
suspect standard, which only derives from extensive judicial and economic 
experience. 
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B. The Commission Failed to Cite a Single Case Dealing with 
Trademarks, Settlements, or Search Advertising in Support of 
Applying the Inherently Suspect Standard. 
Even as it cast aside Actavis, Clorox, and California Dental, the Commission 
could not cite a single case or study that has anything to do with trademarks, 
settlements, or search advertising—the critical issues in this case.  Instead, the cases 
the Commission relies upon to support its evidentiary shortcut involve broad 
advertising bans implemented by industry associations or advertising bans that 
support price fixing and other per se unlawful agreements.14  See Dissent 14-15.   
For example, in In the Matter of Am. Med. Ass’n, Docket No. 9604, 1979 WL 
199033 (F.T.C. Oct. 12, 1979), the Commission held that the American Medical 
Association’s and state medical societies’ ethical rules prohibiting physicians from 
advertising were anticompetitive.  Id. at *86.  This unremarkable holding stems from 
the fact that the rules at issue completely eliminated price signals from reaching 
consumers who, in general, consumed the at-issue medical services locally (and in 
the 1970s would have to call each physician to compare pricing).15  Similarly, 
                                                 
14  The Commission touts 21 studies to demonstrate the supposed robustness of its 
expert’s conclusion that advertising restrictions are anticompetitive.  Op. 20-21.  
But those studies analyze the same kinds of restraints at issue in the 
Commission’s inapposite cases and do not involve trademarks, settlements, or 
search advertising.  See Dissent at 15; CX8006-081-82.   
15  Broad advertising bans were also the subject of several other cases the 
Commission relies upon.  See In the Matter of Mass. Bd. of Registration in 
Optometry, Docket No. 9195, 1988 WL 1025476, at *1-2 (F.T.C. 1988) (price 
advertising ban implemented by the sole licensing authority for optometrists in 
57 
 
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 31-32 (D.C. Cir. 2005), involved an 
agreement between joint venturers to fix prices—per se illegal conduct—and an 
agreement to cease advertising in support of that price-fixing.   
The Challenged Agreements are nothing like the general advertising bans and 
price-fixing reflected in these cases.  See Dissent 10-11; Wright Article at 3 (“[T]he 
challenged agreements do not resemble—much less bear a ‘close family 
resemblance’ to—the general restrictions on advertising contemplated by the 
economic studies and case law” cited by the majority).  In those cases, the problem 
was that no price signals, or only signals reflecting fixed prices, were advertised to 
the market.  Here, that is simply not the case.  If a consumer wanted to learn about 
her options for purchasing contact lenses, all she had to do is type “contact lenses,” 
“contact lens retailers,” “discount contacts,” the name of a contact lens product, or 
any one of thousands of non-trademarked words into a search engine.  See Dissent 
9, 12; Wright Article at 4.  In fact, search engines displayed  for 
contact lenses sold by retailers other than 1-800 Contacts during the relevant period, 
                                                 
Massachusetts); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (complete ban 
on attorney advertising in Arizona); United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass’n, 
Inc., 285 F.2d 688, 689 (7th Cir. 1961).  The Commission also cites Blackburn v. 
Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825 (7th Cir. 1995), but that case involves a naked agreement 
between two law firms not to advertise in one another’s territory.  And Morales 
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992) is a case involving a state 
regulation banning price advertising. 
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not including the numerous other ads online (e.g., social media ads, banner ads) and 
elsewhere (e.g., television, radio, print).  See supra n.10; see also Wright Article at 
4-5.   
Even more fundamentally, the Commission and the cases it cites do not 
account for the Challenged Agreements’ roots in trademark law.  With broad 
advertising bans, competitors have reduced incentive to invest in business 
improvements because they cannot advertise those differentiating features to attract 
customers.  By contrast, trademarks create incentives for the parties to invest in 
business improvements, brand building, and advertising so that customers associate 
those differentiating features with the brand (or a competitor can choose to compete 
without a known brand, including by pure price cutting without brand or service 
investment).  See Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 
(1985) (“National protection of trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, 
because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing 
to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”).  Thus, trademarks promote 
interbrand competition, just like antitrust policy.  See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52 
n.19; Clorox, 117 F.3d at 61. 
As Commissioner Phillips explained, by applying the inherently suspect 
standard without regard to 1-800 Contacts’ trademark rights, the Commission 
creates one of two rules:  “either all advertising restrictions are inherently suspect, 
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regardless of whether they protect intellectual property rights, or the level of scrutiny 
applied to a particular restraint will depend on the strength of the trademark holder’s 
underlying infringement claim.”  Dissent 21.  The Commission expressly disclaims 
the former, but by relying only on cases outside of the trademark context to invoke 
the inherently suspect standard, creates precisely that rule—a dangerous rule that 
would result in near-summary condemnation of any trademark enforcement effort.  
Dissent 21; see supra § I.B.   
The latter rule—requiring re-litigation of the underlying trademark 
infringement lawsuit—is equally dangerous because it permits a years- or even 
decades-later second-guessing of a fact-intensive legal claim with no reliable way to 
predict what would have happened.  Dissent 23-24 (collecting cases and stating 
“Actavis makes it clear that the Commission should not be in the business of 
evaluating the underlying infringement case when deciding an antitrust challenge”); 
Clorox, 117 F.3d at 60 (“[I]t is usually unwise for courts to second-guess [private 
resolutions of trademark disputes].”).  As the Dissent explained, a “rule requiring 
the post hoc evaluation of intellectual property infringement claims will be difficult 
for us to apply, but also, and more importantly, for private parties to self-administer.  
What level of infringement confidence is required? Are plaintiffs only allowed to 
settle trademark infringement claims that they know they are going to win? That 
certainly can’t be the standard.”  Dissent 29.   
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Ultimately, the Commission simply assumes that 1-800 Contacts’ claims were 
invalid as a way to ignore its trademark rights.  Dissent 22 (listing ways the 
Commission’s analysis assumes the invalidity of 1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims).  
The Commission points to no law or policy to justify this assumption, and it leads to 
a rule that enables any plaintiff who takes a different view of parties’ trademark 
rights to expose those parties to near-summary condemnation under the inherently 
suspect standard.  This would represent a dramatic intrusion into trademark policy 
and chill enforcement efforts and investment for fear of antitrust liability—
ultimately reducing the interbrand competition that both trademark and antitrust 
policy aim to promote.  
For all these reasons, the Commission never should have applied an inherently 
suspect analysis.  But even where this standard applies, this Court holds that, “[o]nce 
[the defendant] has shown a procompetitive justification for the conduct,” the 
plaintiff is required to “abandon [the inherently suspect analysis] and proceed to a 
full-blown rule of reason analysis.”  Madison Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey 
League, 270 F. App’x 56, 58 (summary order) (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bogan v. 
Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n.6 (2d Cir. 1999)); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP 
Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 831 (3d Cir. 2010).  Because 1-800 Contacts identified 
pro-competitive justifications (saved litigation costs and protection of trademark 
rights), the Commission was bound to apply the full rule of reason even under its 
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own favored standard.  Either way, if antitrust scrutiny applies at all in this case, it 
must be performed under the rule of reason.   
C. The Commission’s Inherently Suspect Analysis Dramatically 
Departs from the Default Rule of Reason Analysis. 
Contrary to the majority’s suggestion, the inherently suspect standard marks 
a dramatic departure from the default rule of reason.  Under rule of reason analysis, 
a plaintiff must prove as a threshold matter that the challenged restraint adversely 
affects “competition in the market as a whole.”  MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 185.  This 
is a heavy burden, and plaintiffs often fail to offer such proof for a variety of 
reasons—e.g., they do not properly define the relevant market, they fail to show 
reduced output or increased prices, or they do not isolate the observed market 
behavior to the challenged restraint.  See, e.g., Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2285; 
MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 184-85.   
“If the plaintiff carries its burden [on anticompetitive effects], then the burden 
shifts to the defendant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.  If the 
defendant makes this showing, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to 
demonstrate that the procompetitive efficiencies could be reasonably achieved 
through less anticompetitive means.”  Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (internal 
citations omitted). 
Unlike in the default rule-of-reason analysis, the inherently suspect standard 
eliminates the threshold and often most difficult element of the antitrust claim—
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proof of harm to “competition in the market as a whole.”  MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 
185.  Instead, it allows a plaintiff like the Commission here to presume market-wide 
harm, shifting the initial burden to the defendant (here, 1-800 Contacts) to offer 
plausible procompetitive justifications.  Op. 18.  Indeed, according to the 
Commission’s analysis, even after 1-800 Contacts made this pro-competitive 
showing, it “still need not prove actual anticompetitive effects” to meet its burden.  
Op. 21 (citation omitted).  Rather, the Commission only found it necessary to show 
(a) a “theoretical basis” for the alleged effects with some evidence that the effects 
are “likely,” which is an extremely low bar, or (b) that the procompetitive 
justifications can be achieved in a less restrictive way, which is the third step in the 
ordinary rule-of-reason analysis and, thus, comes into play only after the plaintiff 
has satisfied its threshold burden of proving market-wide effects (and after the 
defendant has offered proof of procompetitive benefits).  Op. 21; see K.M.B. 
Warehouse, Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 1995); Clorox, 117 
F.3d at 57.   
In California Dental, the Supreme Court recognized the danger of the lenient, 
theoretical approach reflected in the inherently suspect standard.  Rejecting the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision to apply the inherently suspect standard to the broad advertising 
restriction there, the Supreme Court admonished the Ninth Circuit for doing exactly 
what the Commission did here:  relying on platitudes like “price advertising is 
63 
 
fundamental to price competition” and substituting “a priori analysis” where 
“empirical” answers were possible.  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 773-74.  Indeed, the 
Court criticized the Ninth Circuit for apparently thinking, as the Commission did 
here, that it was “justified without further analysis to shift a burden to [the defendant] 
to adduce hard evidence of the procompetitive nature of its policy; the court’s 
aversion to empirical evidence at the moment of this implicit burden shifting 
underscores the leniency of its enquiry into evidence of the restrictions’ 
anticompetitive effects.”  Id. at 776.    
 Here, too, the Commission relied on the same sort of platitudes and studiously 
avoided hard proof in presuming that “theoretical” effects were “likely.”  Op. 24.  
For example, the Commission said “[e]conomics and prior cases counsel that the 
challenged advertising restrictions prevent consumers from obtaining information 
that would permit price and service comparisons.”  Op. 34.  The Commission then 
touted the supposed “significance” of the advertising at issue, the unremarkable fact 
that some rivals price lower than 1-800 Contacts, and that 1-800 Contacts lost some 
marginal amount of sales when competitors advertised using its trademarks.  Id. at 
33-34.  Even if true, however, this is simply not the type of evidence that can show 
an adverse effect on competition in the market as a whole.  MacDermid, F.3d at 182; 
Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59 (“The antitrust laws do not guarantee competitors the right to 
compete free of encumbrances, however, so long as competition as a whole is not 
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significantly affected.”).  The Commission’s application of this shortcut to avoid its 
burden was an error.   
III. THE COMMISSION FAILED TO PROVE ANTICOMPETITIVE 
EFFECTS IN THE MARKET AS A WHOLE. 
To leave the impression that it was not relying solely on the inherently suspect 
standard, the Commission found that it had offered “direct evidence” that the 
Challenged Agreements caused anticompetitive harm to contact lens purchasers and 
to search engines.  Op. 42-47, 50-54.  But the Commission’s supposed evidence does 
not come close to showing anticompetitive effects “in the market as a whole.”  
MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 182; see also Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 205 (when 
proceeding under the direct evidence method, plaintiff must show the restraint made 
“all . . . consumers [in the market] worse off overall.”). 
The Commission offers no empirical evidence of prices, offers no evidence of 
1-800 Contacts’ profit margins, and has never contended that output was restrained 
or that the quality of contact lenses was reduced.  Instead, the Commission simply 
rebrands the competition-enhancing effect of trademark enforcement and settlement 
as “direct evidence” of anticompetitive harm.  Indeed, the Commission primarily 
relies on two experts whose analyses come to the unremarkable conclusion that, 
without the Challenged Agreements, there would have been more potentially 
infringing search ads displayed and some people who saw those ads might have 
purchased from a retailer other than 1-800 Contacts at a lower price.  But to accept 
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the Commission’s (and its experts’) position that this constitutes direct evidence of 
anticompetitive harm is to accept that exercising trademark (or other IP) rights to 
stop infringement is an antitrust violation.  
A. The Commission Has Not Proven “Direct Evidence” of Harm to 
Consumers. 
The Commission points to two types of “direct evidence”:  (1) a reduction in 
the number of search ads displayed in response to searches for 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademarks; and (2) that “at least some consumers” would have purchased from a 
lower-priced competitor if more paid search ads had been displayed.  Op. 42-47.  
These are not “direct evidence” sufficient to carry the Commission’s burden. 
Alleged Reduction in Advertising.  The Commission treats advertising as if it 
is a goal unto itself and not a means to an end—i.e., to increase sales—in contending 
that a reduction in advertising with no accompanying output effect is nevertheless 
direct evidence of an anticompetitive effect.  Op. 43-44.  The Supreme Court, in a 
case involving the Commission, rejected this rule.  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 776.  In 
reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court in California Dental held that a restriction on 
advertising is not, standing alone, an anticompetitive harm.  The relevant question 
for evaluating advertising restraints, the Court held, “is not whether the universe of 
possible advertisements has been limited (as assuredly it has), but whether the 
limitation on advertisements obviously tends to limit the total delivery of dental 
services.”  Id.   
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Consistent with this holding, Clorox recognized that trademark agreements 
necessarily impose “encumbrances” on competitors, and prevent them from 
“competing as effectively as they otherwise might” by limiting their ability to 
advertise or market their products.  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59.  But that does not 
implicate any antitrust issue unless “competition as a whole” in the sale of the 
underlying products is “significantly affected.”  Id. at 59-60.  In that case, where 
“numerous” companies could compete to sell the product at issue despite the 
trademark agreements, and those agreements did not restrict competitors’ ability “to 
enter these alleged markets,” there was no antitrust issue.  Id. at 59-60.  Clorox thus 
confirms that the focus is not advertising as such, it is the competitiveness of the 
markets in which the advertising occurs.      
The Commission ignores this holding from Clorox and tries to confine 
California Dental to the professional service context because, in the Commission’s 
view, the Court’s holding was based on its finding that consumers experienced 
difficulty making price comparisons of professional services.  Op. 42-43.  In fact, 
courts apply California Dental well outside the professional services context.  See 
Dissent at 13-14 (collecting cases).  More fundamentally, the Commission failed to 
recognize that the reason the Court found consumers’ difficultly in comparing prices 
to be important was that a reduction in advertising might not have an effect on output 
of dental services.  Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 773-778; see also Dissent 30.  At all 
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points, the Court was focused on the effect in the underlying market and not on the 
number of ads available, which the Court acknowledged were reduced.    
This case, in which the Commission does not contend that the Challenged 
Agreement affected the output of contact lenses, presents no reason for abandoning 
this focus.  Indeed, it is particularly illogical to deem a reduction in ads to be direct 
evidence of anticompetitive harm when the very issue in the trademark litigations 
underlying the agreements was whether those ads infringed 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademarks.16  As a result, a reduction in advertising could just as well be a 
competition-enhancing result of trademark policy.  See Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57 
(trademark agreements promote competition even where they “only marginally 
advance[ ] trademark polic[y].”).  The Commission’s rule is effectively a rule against 
good-faith trademark enforcement unless litigated to final verdict.   
In any event, the Commission failed to prove as a matter of fact that the 
Challenged Agreements caused a reduction in advertising, or even paid search 
advertising.  Dissent 41-42.  The Commission provides no evidence of the 
                                                 
16  Perhaps recognizing the shaky foundation on which its advertising-as-a-harm 
theory rests, the Commission pivots to a rule that reductions of “truthful 
information” constitute an anticompetitive harm.  Op. 43.  Neither of the cases 
the Commission cites in support of this rule—Ind. Fed’n, 476 U.S. 447 and In 
the Matter of Realcomp II Ltd., Docket No. 9320, 2007 WL 6936319 (F.T.C. Oct. 
30, 2007)—involve restraints on information.  Instead, they address reductions 
in output of the underlying services (dental x-rays and real estate listings).  
Dissent at 30-31. 
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Challenged Agreement counterparties’ advertising spend or how those 
counterparties adjusted it after the Challenged Agreements.17  Dissent 40.  As a 
result, the Commission did not present evidence to show that the number of ads or 
the amount of truthful information was actually reduced, even if those were 
cognizable forms of “direct evidence” in this context.   
Alleged Price Effect.  The Commission’s finding of “direct evidence of a 
price effect” is even more lacking.  The fact that one competitor charges higher 
prices than another is not direct evidence of an anticompetitive effect, particularly 
when IP rights are at stake.  See, Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (acknowledging a patent 
owner may be able to charge high prices); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. 
v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 896-97 (2007); Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 204-05.  To 
prove an anticompetitive price effect, a plaintiff must provide a rigorous analysis of 
prices, margins, and causal connection to the at-issue agreements.  See Am. Express, 
833 F.3d at 205-06.  And it must show an effect that permeates the market as a 
                                                 
17  The Commission claims that some counterparties to the Challenged Agreements 
chose keywords based on return on investment, as opposed to maintaining a fixed 
advertising budget, although it does no analysis to verify this.  Op. 44 n.46.  
According to the Commission, because some counterparties found 1-800 
Contacts’ trademarks to be more profitable than others, the counterparties may 
not have switched to other keywords.  The Commission cites nothing to support 
its necessary thesis that competitors must have access to their top advertising 
choices even where those choices infringe a trademark.  This lack of citation is 
unsurprising; that is not the law.  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59 (no anticompetitive harm 
even where infringement might be more effective).  
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whole.  Id. at 205; MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 186-87 (no showing of anticompetitive 
effects even assuming some consumers purchased from the defendant instead of 
another option); CDC Techs., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir. 
1999).   
The Commission does not even try to show a price effect in this way.  Instead, 
the Commission’s so-called price effect is really just a prediction that “at least some 
consumers” who searched for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks on a search engine after 
2004 (when the first Challenged Agreement went into effect) would have purchased 
from a lower-priced competitor if they had seen additional search advertising. 18  Op. 
46-47.  Of course, the fact that “at least some consumers” did not see the infringing 
advertisements is a function of 1-800 Contacts validly exercising its trademark 
rights.  That cannot be “anticompetitive.”  Putting that aside, however, the notion 
that “at least some consumers” might have paid more for contact lenses because they 
did not see a competitive advertisement is not proof of harm to competition as a 
whole.  See Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 205. 
                                                 
18  The Commission’s analysis of direct price effects also is flawed because it is 
based on the assumption that the market is limited to the sale of contact lenses 
online.  E.g., Op. 48-49 (referring to 1-800 Contacts’ as the “incumbent online 
seller, with a dominant share of online sales.”).  But the Commission has not 
proven any relevant market and, thus, cannot rely on inferences flowing from the 
market being limited in that way.  See Geneva Pharms. v. Barr Labs., 386 F.3d 
485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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To the extent the Commission speculates the Challenged Agreements enabled 
1-800 Contacts to maintain “supracompetitive” prices generally, there is no evidence 
to support that theory.  Indeed, the Commission specifically chose to avoid empirical 
evidence of pricing, and the empirical and other record evidence that does exist 
refutes any such price effect.   
First, it is undisputed that 1-800 Contacts has charged generally higher prices 
than its purely online competitors (though lower than 60 percent of the market) 
before any of the Challenged Agreements existed.  Dissent 32; see also Am. Express, 
138 S. Ct. at 2288 (rejecting a finding of anticompetitive effects and noting “Amex 
has historically charged higher merchant fees than these competitors”).   
Second, the Commission offered no evidence at all on profit margins.  Dissent 
33-34.  This is critical because this Court and the Supreme Court have repeatedly 
focused not just on prices in the abstract, but rather on margins, in antitrust cases to 
determine whether a given price is supracompetitive.  See Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 
205 (requiring proof of “abnormally high” profit margins), aff’d, 138 S.Ct. at 2288 
(noting the failure of the Government to offer any measure of profit margins); see 
also Geneva Pharm., 386 F.3d at 500.  The only evidence on margins was offered 
by 1-800 Contacts,  
.  RX0739-0063 to 65.  The Commission tries to 
nullify that evidence by making an unsupported claim that calculating margins “in 

72 
 
here.  See, e.g., Complaint at 7, In re J.M. Smucker Co. & Conagra Brands, Inc., 
Docket No. 9381 (F.T.C. Mar. 5, 2018); Analysis of the Agreement Containing 
Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment at 2, In the Matter of McCormick & Co., 
Docket No. C-4225 (F.T.C. July 30, 2008).   
Finally, the Commission’s complete failure to even attempt to quantify any 
price effect—or empirically test 1-800 Contacts’ prices at all—bears emphasis.  
Dissent 33; Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 947 (reversal by Supreme Court driven in part 
by an “‘aversion to empirical evidence’ in favor of burden shifting”).  The 
Commission contends that it does not need to provide a “precise competitive price” 
to show direct evidence that 1-800 Contacts’ prices were supracompetitive.  Op. 49.  
This is not a matter of precision:  the Commission made no effort at any 
quantification.  See K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 128 (citation omitted) (requiring 
an “empirical demonstration” of adverse effects).  Instead, it says that “some 
consumers” paid a price higher than they would have without the Challenged 
Agreements.  But that position has no limiting principle.  Without any quantification 
of a price effect, there is no way to know whether any given price is the product of 
a competitive market or not, and a plaintiff could meet its initial burden by showing 
that even one person paid a higher price—effectively eliminating any burden of 
proof under the rule of reason.       
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Ultimately, the Commission’s “direct evidence” of price effects supposedly 
caused by the Challenged Agreements is a mere theory offered by its experts that 1-
800 Contacts might have lowered its prices if there was more advertising (or 
infringement of its trademarks).  Op. 49; see also Dissent 33.  Under the direct 
evidence method, however, a theory cannot substitute for facts, and it is beyond 
dispute that the Commission has not provided any facts showing that the Challenged 
Agreements caused a relevant price effect.   
B. The Commission Did Not Prove that the Challenged Agreements 
Harmed Search Engines. 
The Commission also claims that it has offered direct evidence of harm to 
search engines in the form of (1) a reduction in the price paid in auctions involving 
1-800 Contacts’ trademarks; and (2) a reduction in the quality of search engine 
results pages due to a reduction in the number of ads.  This is yet another “novel” 
theory.  Dissent 38.  Like the Commission’s flawed attempts to show direct evidence 
of harm to consumers, the Commission conflates the intended effect of trademark 
policy with anticompetitive harm to search engines, and, in any event, none of it 
constitutes evidence of harm to the market as a whole.21  MacDermid, 833 F.3d at 
184; accord Clorox, 117 F.3d at 59.  This holding is all the more egregious 
                                                 
21  The Commission argues that the Commission could also find harm to search 
engines using the inherently suspect standard.  Op. 50-51 n.54.  As explained in 
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 159-60, the inherently suspect standard is not appropriate in 
these novel and complex circumstances.  See supra § II.   
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considering that Google affirmatively instructed 1-800 Contacts (and other brand 
owners) to settle trademark disputes related to keyword bidding in exactly the way 
that 1-800 Contacts did.  See CX9031-010 to 011.  In other words, the Commission 
apparently believes that Google set up an antitrust conspiracy against itself.  And 
Microsoft, for its part, declared that it was “  
 
”  RX0704-0007.   
The Commission contends that there is “direct evidence” of anticompetitive 
effects because search engines received less money from advertisers when a person 
clicked on an ad displayed in response to searches for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks.  
Op. 51-53.  But any price reduction on an infinitesimal percentage of search engines’ 
sales is not “direct evidence” that the Challenged Agreements “significantly 
affect[ed] competition as a whole” in any relevant advertising market.22  Clorox, 117 
F.3d at 59.  Without proof of effects on competition, a reduction in the prices of 
certain sales does not constitute direct evidence.   
                                                 
22  The Commission does not attempt to define a “market” for search engine 
advertising, and courts have rejected such a narrow market definition.  See, e.g., 
Lasoff v. Amazon.com Inc., No. C16-151, 2017 WL 832941, at *4 (W.D. Wash. 
Jan. 26, 2017) (rejecting a “search engine advertising” market as too narrow).  
Thus, the relevant question is whether the Challenged Agreements, which relate 
to bidding on certain trademarked terms of certain competitors of one product 
(contact lenses) in one form of advertising (paid search advertising), impact a 
broader market for advertising generally.  Plainly, they do not.    
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Moreover, the Commission proffered no evidence that the parties to the 
Challenged Agreements reduced their advertising budgets or spends.  This is 
important because, even if the parties to the Challenged Agreements were unable to 
bid on certain trademarked terms, they could have shifted their advertising spend 
elsewhere—whether online or to another advertising channel.  For example, 1-800 
Contacts could have spent the money it saved on its trademarked keywords to engage 
in additional advertising, online or elsewhere, to build its brand or drive consumers 
online.  See IDF 63 (1-800 Contacts’ television advertising drives online sales).  
Moreover, retailers that were not parties to a Challenged Agreement could have 
purchased more advertising by bidding on 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks as keywords, 
bidding on other keywords, or spending more money in other advertising channels.  
Numerous other permutations exist under which the Challenged Agreements would 
have a revenue-neutral or revenue-increasing effect for sellers of advertising.  
Although ruling these possibilities out would be only the first of many steps in 
directly proving harm to competition to sell advertising, the Commission did not 
even get that far because it myopically focused on sales of search ads related to 1-
800 Contacts’ trademarks to only a handful of contact lens retailers.23    
                                                 
23  Instead of examining advertising budgets and spend, the Commission majority 
cited testimony of certain counterparties to the Challenged Agreements that they 
bid on keywords based on expected return on investment.  Op. 54.  The 
Commission assumes that, once these counterparties were forbidden from 
bidding on their “first-choice of keywords” (1-800 Contacts), they would not 
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Given all of the ways that retailers may have shifted their purchases, it is no 
wonder that Microsoft  
  RX0704-0007.  And it defies common sense to suggest that Google 
would have advised 1-800 Contacts to settle trademark disputes on exactly the terms 
in the Challenged Agreements if those agreements would harm its ability to compete 
in any advertising market.  CX9031-010 to 011.   
The Commission also claims that the Challenged Agreements harmed the 
quality of the search engines’ results pages by reducing the number of ads shown in 
response to searches for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks.  Op. 52-53.  This is merely a 
rehashing of the Commission’s legally-flawed argument that a reduction in the 
number of ads is direct evidence of harm to consumers.  See supra § III.A.  And the 
Commission provides no reason to believe that the number of ads shown by a search 
engine equates to the quality of the results page.  Indeed, that theory is refuted by 
the evidence.  Both Google and Microsoft, by telling brand owners to settle 
trademark disputes related to keyword bidding on their own, IDF 293, 297, evidently 
decided that whatever reduction in search advertising that might occur was worth it 
                                                 
have replaced those bids with other keywords or advertising generally.  Id.  As 
the Dissent recognized, while that might be one plausible hypothesis, it “equally 
plausible they would have bought other advertisements, with no harm going to 
the owners of the search engines.”  Dissent 41.  It was the Commission’s burden 
to prove competitive harm in an advertising market, not to pile up assumptions 
and declare it.      
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in exchange for extracting themselves from the time and expense of mediating 
trademark disputes, or themselves being party to lawsuits. 
IV. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN REJECTING 1-800 CONTACTS’
EVIDENCE OF PROCOMPETITIVE EFFECTS.
The Commission’s failure to prove anticompetitive effects alone should be the
end of this case.  However, it botched the rest of the elements of the rule of reason 
analysis, too, including with respect to 1-800 Contacts’ procompetitive 
justifications.  In particular, though the Commission acknowledges that the 
Challenged Agreements actually saved millions in litigation costs and were designed 
to protect 1-800 Contacts’ brand, it sets the value of those recognized benefits at 
zero based on new rules invented to eliminate them from the antitrust analysis.  Op. 
37-41.
As to the millions in saved litigation costs, the Commission claims that they 
do not count because 1-800 Contacts did not provide evidence that those saved 
litigation costs were passed on to consumers in the form of cost savings.  Op. 37.  
The Commission cites no authority that litigation costs must be “passed on.”   
In fact, Actavis specifically recognized saved litigation costs as a 
procompetitive benefit, without suggesting that such savings count only if they are 
passed on to consumers.  Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156-57.  Given that Actavis arose in 
the context of a market-blocking patent, it is particularly unlikely that such litigation 
costs would be passed on to consumers where the patentee monopolist would have 
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no incentive to do so.  And, while not in the litigation savings context, just last year 
the Supreme Court rejected the notion that there needs to be proof of pass on.  Am. 
Express, 138 S. Ct. 2288-89.  Moreover, as the Dissent correctly observes, because 
saved litigation costs do not impact marginal costs, there is no practical way to show 
that such cost savings were passed on to consumers.  Dissent 36.  Thus, while the 
Commission acknowledges that saved litigation costs are a procompetitive benefit, 
it has created a rule where they never count. 
As to the protection of trademarks, the Commission deems this justification 
invalid because 1-800 Contacts’ infringement claims allegedly did not meet some 
“minimum threshold of validity—more than merely surviving challenges as shams.”  
Op. 40.  In other words, to the Commission, the trademark claims were not a sham, 
but they also were “not good enough” for antitrust purposes.   
The Commission cites no authority for this “not good enough” rule.  Nor does 
it offer any explanation of what it means or how parties trying to settle cases would 
have any idea how to apply it.  But, whatever threshold the Commission is trying to 
employ, it is met in this case.  As discussed above, trademark infringement cases 
involving keyword bidding frequently survive dispositive motions, judges and juries 
have found liability for this type of conduct, and courts—including as to 1-800 
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Contacts’ claims—have entered injunctions preventing this type of conduct. 24  See 
supra 27-29.   
The reason the Commission had to contort the rules is obvious.  Under the 
rule of reason, the Commission would have to balance anticompetitive harms against 
procompetitive benefits.  Am. Express, 838 F.3d at 195.  The Commission’s “proof” 
of anticompetitive effects is that the Challenged Agreements reduced the number of 
paid search ads displayed in response to searches for 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks 
and that reduction allegedly affected prices paid by “at least some consumers.”  See 
supra § III.A.  Even accepting for the sake of argument that these were valid 
anticompetitive effects, the Commission would have to balance that undefined 
competitive effect against the millions of dollars in concrete cost savings and 1-800 
Contacts’ undeniable right to protect its brand.  There simply is no credible way that, 
with this proof, the Challenged Agreements could be, on balance, anticompetitive, 
                                                 
24  The Commission cites several dismissals or denials of preliminary injunctions in 
cases involving allegations of trademark infringement related to search 
advertising.  Op. 39 n.43.  Virtually all of these cases post-date the Challenged 
Agreements and therefore are irrelevant to 1-800 Contacts’ trademark claims or 
the antitrust analysis of the Challenged Agreements, which “are to be judged at 
the time the agreements were entered into.”  In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride 
Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (quoting Valley Drug 
Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003)); see also 
SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1207 (2d Cir. 1981).  As the Dissent 
correctly observes, trademark law at the time of the Challenged Agreements 
supported 1-800 Contacts’ claims, which is why even the majority agrees they 
were not shams.  Dissent at 24-26. 
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which is why the Commission invented rules that allowed it to ignore 1-800 
Contacts’ proof of procompetitive effects.   
V. THE COMMISSION HAS NOT SHOWN A LESS RESTRICTIVE 
ALTERNATIVE. 
Under the rule of reason, courts do not consider whether a less restrictive 
alternative exists until after the plaintiff proves market-wide anticompetitive effects 
and the defendant proves procompetitive benefits.  K.M.B. Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 
127.  In the Commission’s inherently suspect analysis, however, it tried to substitute 
a proffered less restrictive alternative for anticompetitive effects.  See supra 38.  But 
regardless of where it is placed in the analysis, the Commission has not shown a less 
restrictive alternative.   
Under this Court’s precedent, “absent exceptional circumstances . . . the 
parties’ determination of the scope of needed trademark protections is entitled to 
substantial weight.”  Clorox, 117 F.3d at 60.  Far from giving “substantial weight” 
to 1-800 Contacts’ and the counterparties’ determinations as to the scope of the 
Challenged Agreements, the Commission gave no weight to the parties’ views.  The 
less restrictive alternative the Commission touts—“disclosure” of affiliation when 
bidding on trademarks—is conjured from the Commission’s imagination.  Op. 27.  
By its own admission, the Commission has no evidence that anyone has settled these 
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types of infringement cases using such disclosures.25  Op. 29.  And it rejects without 
explanation 1-800 Contacts’ trademark practitioner expert’s unchallenged testimony 
that parties involved in infringement litigation involving this type of conduct settle 
the cases with non-use provisions because of the ease of monitoring and certainty 
that such settlements provide.  RX0734-0119 to 23. 
The Commission tries to prop up its imagined solution for resolving trademark 
infringement by pointing to its regulatory authority to remedy unilateral false 
advertising and other deceptive practices, which sometimes involves disclosures. 
Op. 28-30.  This misses the point of Clorox.  The parties’ determinations as to 
whether and how to resolve trademark infringement are entitled to “substantial 
weight” because the parties are the best advocates for their interests and, thus, “are 
in the best position” to achieve an optimal solution.  117 F.3d at 60.  In this case, if 
the counterparties thought that the ability to display ads in response to searches for 
1-800 Contacts’ trademarks was critical (or even material) to their competitive
success, they would not have agreed to stop this advertising (and sometimes pay 1-
800 Contacts) and instead continued to litigate.  Instead of doing that, however, they 
25  The Commission tries to explain away its lack of evidence by claiming that many 
of these settlements are confidential.  Op. 29.  This should not be permitted as an 
excuse, as the Commission has subpoena power it could have used to gain access 
to these confidential settlements. 
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rationally agreed to settle with “non-use” provisions—a decision that Clorox holds 
should not be “second-guess[ed].”  Id.  
What the Commission has done here, therefore, is to overrule the parties’ 
judgment about their own best interests and effectively dictate that the only way that 
anyone can settle these types of infringement claims is through use of disclosures.  
The Commission’s fiat cannot be squared with Clorox’s deference to parties’ 
rational judgments as to how best resolve trademark disputes.   
VI. THE COMMISSION ERRED BY LUMPING THE LUXOTTICA 
AGREEMENT TOGETHER WITH THE CHALLENGED 
SETTLEMENTS. 
As part of the Commission’s presumption-driven condemnation of the 
Challenged Agreements, the Commission sweeps in the Luxottica sourcing and 
services agreement—a vertical collaboration with unique benefits among the 
Challenged Agreements.  Under this agreement, 1-800 Contacts provides back-end 
services that make Luxottica (the owner of several brick-and-mortar retail stores) 
and 1-800 Contacts stronger competitors.  IDF 394-95  
 
.   
These are well-recognized competition-enhancing benefits that the 
Commission ignores in applying the inherently suspect standard (and the “direct 
evidence” method) to the Luxottica agreement.  Dissent 43-45.  In fact, the only time 
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the Commission mentions the Luxottica agreement separately from the Challenged 
Settlements is to say that it is not a settlement.  That’s the point:  the unique benefits 
of the Luxottica agreement should have been analyzed on their own, rather than 
discarded without consideration.  Dissent 45. 
The Commission’s decision to ignore these benefits highlights the errors 
throughout its opinion.  In the Commission’s apparent view, the fact that the 
Luxottica agreement actually reduced contact lens prices and benefitted customers 
does not matter to the application of the inherently suspect standard.  This is plainly 
wrong because the inherently suspect standard applies only to arrangements that are 
obviously anticompetitive, not to arrangements with obvious competition-enhancing 
benefits.  See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 770.  The failure to consider these benefits 
also undermines its “direct evidence” analysis because the Commission failed to 
balance its unquantified and hypothetical anticompetitive harms against the 
recognized competition-enhancing benefits stemming from the Luxottica 
agreement.  See id.       
VII. THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED TO THE COMMISSION 
FOR FURTHER CONSIDERATION. 
If this Court finds that the Commission has not proven its case under the 
truncated standards described above, it should not remand this case to the 
Commission for further consideration.  Cal. Dental, 224 F.3d at 959 (remanding 
only to dismiss).  The Commission had every opportunity to decide whether the 
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ALJ’s traditional rule of reason analysis was valid or not, and its tactical decision to 
abandon that analysis should not give it a “second bite at the apple” on appeal.  See 
id.  In any event, the Commission cannot prove its case under the full rule of reason, 
so a remand would be futile.  
First, the Commission has no evidence of harm to competition in the market 
as a whole, and the evidence that does exist flatly refutes it.  The Commission chose 
a strategy under which it and its experts stated the obvious—that the Challenged 
Agreements prevented certain competitors from running potentially infringing ads 
in response to 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks, and 1-800 Contacts accordingly 
preserved some amount of sales that might have been diverted by those ads.  This is 
simply another way of restating that 1-800 Contacts validly exercised its trademark 
rights, which cannot be anticompetitive “on balance” under any analysis.  Moreover, 
the Commission did not even try to show that the Challenged Agreements increased 
market prices, increased 1-800 Contacts’ margins, decreased output, or impacted 
quality.  Without evidence of these types of effects, the Commission cannot prove 
its case on remand.26     
                                                 
26  The Commission also committed another error that cannot be resolved on 
remand:  it treated all of the Challenged Agreements as if they are a single 
agreement.  This aggregation is impermissible unless the Commission can 
establish a “rim” connecting each of the counterparties to the Challenged 
Agreements.  See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 842 F.3d 
34, 56-58 (1st Cir. 2016).  Here, the Commission has not shown that the 
counterparties knew about one another’s agreements, much less that each of their 
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Second, the crux of a full rule of reason analysis is whether the Challenged 
Agreements facilitated or enhanced the exercise of market power.  See K.M.B. 
Warehouse, 61 F.3d at 129.  The Supreme Court recently defined market power as 
“the ability to raise price profitably by restricting output.”  Am. Express, 138 S. Ct. 
at 2288.  The Commission cannot make this critical showing because it does not 
contend that the Challenged Agreements restricted output of contact lenses.  ID at 
153 n.36.     
Third, the Commission cannot prevail if it must consider 1-800 Contacts’ 
proof of procompetitive effects.  The Commission concedes that the Challenged 
Settlements saved millions of dollars in litigation costs and were driven by legitimate 
(non-sham) claims.  These are compelling procompetitive justifications that the 
Commission was only able to discount through new and unfounded legal rules. 
Moreover, the Commission cannot show that there are “less restrictive alternatives.” 
This Court requires that “substantial weight” be given to the parties’ judgment on 
how to structure their settlements, and rejects any attempt by the Commission to 
second-guess that judgment with its own preferences.  For all these reasons, the 
decisions to enter into an agreement depended on all others entering a similar 
agreement.  Id.  On remand, the Commission would have to show that each 
agreement caused anticompetitive effects on competition as a whole, a showing 
that the Commission cannot make on this record. 
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Commission simply cannot—on this record—meet its burden under the full rule of 
reason analysis.   
VIII. THE COMMISSION’S ORDER IS OVERLY BROAD AND SHOULD 
BE NARROWED. 
If the Court decides in the Commission’s favor, it should still modify the Final 
Order to tailor it to the conduct at issue in this case.  The Commission’s theory in 
this case is that 1-800 Contacts’ trademark enforcement methods generated harm 
because of the mechanics of paid search advertising, and it purports not to disturb 
the general principle that trademark enforcement is procompetitive.  Nevertheless, 
the Commission’s Final Order interjects the Commission into all of 1-800 Contacts’ 
trademark enforcement efforts regardless of whether they have anything to do with 
search advertising, and effectively leaves 1-800 Contacts with no practical way to 
settle infringement claims.  This weakens 1-800 Contacts’ ability to enforce its 
trademarks.27   
                                                 
27  The Commission is not strictly limited to enjoining just the challenged conduct 
if its decision is upheld.  But this is not a limitless authority.  The enjoined 
conduct must be an alternate “road[] to the prohibited goal.”  FTC v. Ruberoid 
Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (1952).  The Commission has not articulated a theory, let 
alone a factual basis, to conclude that 1-800 Contacts’ general trademark 
enforcement provides a way to circumvent the Commission’s order.  See ITT 
Cont’l Baking Co. v. FTC, 532 F.2d 207, 222 (2d Cir. 1976) (striking sections of 
the Commission’s order directed at conduct lacking a “reasonable relationship” 
to conduct found illegal and finding them “too broad to be sustained”).   
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In particular, the Court should reject Section II.C of the Final Order.  This 
provision precludes 1-800 Contacts from entering into any agreement with a seller 
of contact lenses that places any limitation on “truthful, non-deceptive, and non-
infringing advertising or promotion” whether or not related to search advertising.  
Order § II.C.  This leaves 1-800 Contacts with no reasonable way to settle trademark 
infringement lawsuits in any advertising context because the very question at issue 
in those cases is whether the advertising is infringing.  Dissent 45-46. 
In addition, the Court should strike Section IV.B.1-2.  These provisions 
require 1-800 Contacts to report to the Commission every time it communicates with 
anyone about their suspected trademark infringement in any context.  Order § 
IV.B.1.  And, 1-800 Contacts at the time of such communication has to send the 
suspected infringer a letter noting that 1-800 Contacts’ trademarks are under 
supervision by the Commission.  Order § IV.B.2.  This increases enforcement costs, 
which itself will decrease 1-800 Contacts’ enforcement efforts, and makes it less 
likely that suspected infringers will cease the infringement. 
At a minimum, the Final Order should be narrowed to tailor it to the purported 
harms at issue in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Commission’s decision should be vacated and 
remanded to the Commission with instructions to dismiss.  
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